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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This appeal arises out of a federal trademark infringement lawsuit ("OBC Lawsuit")

brought by Oregon Brewing Company ("OBC") for the wrongful use of its trademark "Rogue"
by Appellant Scout, LLC, d/b/a Gone Rogue Pub ("Scout"). The OBC Complaint alleged that
Scout's wrongful use of its trademark (an "advertising injury") began in October 2012. (R., p.
51, <J[ 14.) (Appendix A.) This infringing use/advertising injury began before Respondent Truck
Insurance Exchange ("Truck") issued a Businessowners Liability policy to Gone Rogue Pub
("Policy") on November 7, 2012. (R., p. 162.)
Scout tendered the defense of the OBC Lawsuit to Truck under the Policy. (R., p. 326.)
The Policy excluded from coverage any advertising injury "[a]rising out of oral or written
publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy
period." ("Prior Publication exclusion") (R., p. 234.) (Appendix B.) Truck denied coverage and
the tender of defense based on the Prior Publication exclusion and the allegations in the OBC
Complaint that the first publication of the infringing mark took place in October 2012, before the
beginning of the Policy period on November 7, 2012. (R., pp. 336-342.)
Scout sued Truck for allegedly breaching its duty to defend it in the OBC Lawsuit. (R.,
p. 6-13.) The District Court granted summary judgment dismissing breach of contract on the
grounds that there was no potential for liability under the Policy because the Prior Publication
exclusion applied and therefore Truck had no duty to defend Scout in the OBC Lawsuit and
dismissing breach of the implied covenant of good faith and good fair dealing and bad faith on
1

the grounds that there can be neither if there is no coverage under the Policy or breach of
contract. (R., pp. 595-613.) (Appendix C.)
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Truck agrees with Scout's "Procedural History" but adds the following:
Scout timely filed its Notice of Appeal on August 23, 2017. (R., pp. 616-621.)

C.

Statement of Facts.
Truck disagrees with Scout's characterization that the District Court's recitation of facts

in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment are "factual
findings". The parties requested a jury trial and, therefore, the District Court was not a finder of
fact when ruling on the motions for summary judgment. (R., pp. 13, 22.) Truck agrees that
Scout has correctly quoted the District Court's recitation of facts but disagrees that all of the
facts set forth by Scout are relevant to the issues on appeal. The parties, the District Court and
this Court are constrained to reviewing the facts in the OBC Complaint and the Policy to
determine whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment. See Hoyle v. Utica
Mut'l Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371-372, 48 P.3d 1256, 1260-1261 (2002). Truck refocuses the

facts accordingly:
1.

OBC Complaint

Within the four corners of the OBC Complaint and its attachments, 1 the following facts
bearing on coverage are alleged:

1

Attachments to a complaint are a part of the complaint for all purposes. I.R.C.P. lO(c).
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a.

b.
c.

d.
e.
f.
g.

OBC has continuously used the Rogue mark in the name of Roguebranded restaurants, brew pubs and alcohol beverages since 1989 and
owns five (5) trademark registrations for the Rogue mark for use with
restaurant and pub services, glassware, beer, ale and clothing. (R., p. 50, 'II
9.)
These marks were applied for and issued prior to Scout/Gone Rogue Pub's
"conduct giving rise to" the OBC Lawsuit. (R., p. 50, 'I[ 10.)
Scout/Gone Rogue Pub's "conduct giving rise to" the OBC Lawsuit began
in October 2012 when Scout/Gone Rogue Pub commenced use of the
Rogue mark to market and advertise Gone Rogue Pub. (R., p. 51, 'II 14.)
Scout/Gone Rogue Pub continued to use the same Rogue mark until at
least September 2014. (R., pp. 52-53, 'I[ 17.)
The unauthorized use of the Rogue mark violated all five (5) trademarks
held by OBC. (R., pp. 53-54, 'I[ 24.)
Scout/Gone Rogue Pub's wrongful conduct caused harm to OBC. (R., p.
54, 'II 25.)
Attached as an exhibit to the OBC Complaint is a Facebook posting
showing use in the Gone Rogue name and logo of the infringing Rogue
mark in October 2012. (R., p. 131.) ("October Post") The Facebook
posting shows a picture of the "Gone Rogue Pub" logo with
accompanying text stating "Here is our new logo! Signs are going up
today and tomorrow! Hope everyone likes it! Let us know what you guys
think !" / d.

(Appendix A.)

2.

The Policy.

The Policy was issued with an effective Policy period beginning November 7,
2012. (R., p. 162.) The relevant provisions of the Policy are as follows:
BUSINESSOWNERS LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM

A.

Coverages
1.
Business Liability
a.
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury",
"property damage", "personal injury" or "advertising
injury" to which this insurance applies. We will have the
right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit"
3

seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for
"bodily injury", "property damage", "personal injury", or
"advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply.

b.

This insurance applies:
(2) To:

"Advertising injury" caused by an offense
committed in the course of advertising your
goods, products, or services;
but only if the offense was committed in the
"coverage territory" during the policy period.
(b)

B.

Exclusions
1.
Applicable To Business Liability Coverage
This insurance does not apply to:
p.

Personal Or Advertising Injury
"Personal Injury" or "advertising injury":
(2)

F.

Arising out of oral or written publication of material
whose first publication took place before the
beginning of the policy period;

Liability And Medical Expenses Definitions
1.
"Advertising injury" means injury arising out of one or more of the
following offenses:
a.
Oral or written publication of material that slanders or
libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or
organization's goods, products or services;
b.
Oral or written publication of material that violates a
person's right to privacy;
c.
Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business; or
d.
Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.

(R., pp. 229,231,234, 239.) (Appendix B.)
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
Truck believes that the "Issues Presented on Appeal" can be more clearly and co~cisely
stated as follows:
1.

Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing breach of

contract on the grounds that there was no potential for liability under the Policy because
coverage was excluded and, therefore, there was no duty to defend?
2.

Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith on the grounds that there can be no
breach of the implied covenant or bad faith when there is no coverage or breach of contract?
3.

Whether Scout is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839?

III. ARGUMENT
The OBC Complaint clearly alleges the undisputed facts bearing on coverage advertising injury (infringement of a trademark) arising out of a written publication of allegedly
infringing material (the Gone Rogue Pub name and logo) first published by Scout (in October
2012) before the Businessowners Policy became effective (November 7, 2012). Application of
the clear and unambiguous Policy language (the Prior Publication exclusion) to these undisputed
facts show that there is no potential for liability under the Policy. There is no duty to defend
when there is no potential for liability under the Policy. Because there was no duty to defend,
there was no breach of contract and because there was no breach of contract there can be no
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or bad faith. The District Court
properly dismissed Scout's Complaint against Truck.
5

A.

Standard of Review.
When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the

same standard used by the District Court in ruling on the motion. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho
v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415,418,234 P.3d 739,742 (2010). Summary judgment is proper if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(a). The Court is to liberally construe all disputed
facts and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party.
Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media, 163 Idaho 70, _ , 408 P.3d 70-71 (2017). (Citations
omitted.) The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. "The fact that the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment does
not change the applicable standard of review and this Court must evaluate each party's motion
on its own merits." Intermountain Forrest Mgt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233,
235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001 ). The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not
establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact, nor does it transform the trial court that
will hear those motions into the trier of fact. Nettleton, 163 Idaho at __ , 408 P.3d at 71.

B.

Analysis.
There is no breach of contract by Truck unless there was a duty to defend Scout against

the allegations and claims in the OBC Complaint. There is no duty to defend if there is no
potential for liability under the Businessowners Policy. There is no potential for liability under
the Policy if the claims alleged in the OBC Complaint are excluded from coverage. All of the
claims alleged in the OBC Complaint are excluded from coverage by the Prior Publication
6

exclusion. There is no potential for liability under the Policy. There was no duty to defend
Scout in the OBC Lawsuit and therefore there was no breach of contract.

1.

The OBC Complaint Did Not Give Rise to a Potential for Liability Under the
Policy; No Duty to Defend was Triggered; the District Court Properly
Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing Breach of Contract.

There is no duty to defend if the allegations in the underlying complaint do not give rise
to a potential for liability under the insurance policy. Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 1262.
"The duty to defend exists so long as there is a genuine dispute over facts bearing on coverage
under the policy or over the application of the policy's language to the facts." Construction
Management System, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680, 682-83, 23 P.3d 142,
144-145 (2001 ). Scout argues on appeal: (1) there exists a genuine dispute over the facts
bearing on coverage because the District Court erred when it broadly construed the OBC
Complaint to determine whether the Prior Publication exclusion applied; and (2) there exists a
genuine dispute over the application of the Policy language to the facts because the District
Court erred in finding the Prior Publication exclusion was unambiguous because: (a) there is a
split of authority amongst other Courts in the interpretation and application of the exclusion; and
(b) the exclusion is susceptible to at least two differing and reasonable interpretations as applied
to this case.
a.

There is No Genuine Dispute Over Facts Bearing on Coverage.

Under Idaho law, the only facts bearing on coverage are those facts alleged in the OBC
Complaint. There is no genuine dispute over those facts. Scout attempts to create a dispute by
looking at facts outside of the OBC Complaint that allegedly show that the prior publication of
7

OBC's Rogue mark was not injurious when made or did not cause the same injury as later
publications or were fresh wrongs not otherwise excluded. However, disputes based on facts
outside of the OBC Complaint are irrelevant to the determination of whether there is a potential
for liability under the Policy. Regardless, the OBC Complaint alleges injury arising out of the
pre-policy publication and continuing to cause the same or similar injury after the Policy was
issued.
(1)

Under Idaho Law, Only Facts Within the Four Corners of the
Underlying Complaint Filed Against Its Insured Can Be
Considered to Determine Whether There is a Duty to Defend.

The analysis of whether an insurer has a duty to defend an insured is limited to a review
of the facts and allegations of the complaint filed against the insured (sometimes referred to as
the Four Corners Doctrine) and a determination of whether the complaint, read broadly, gives
rise to a potential for liability covered by the policy. Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 371-372, 48 P.3d at
1260-1261 (2002). Whether the complaint gives rise to a potential for liability under the
insurance policy is determined exclusively by the facts and claims alleged in the complaint.
Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 1262 (citing Construction Management System, Inc., 135
Idaho at 684, 23 P.3d at 146 (" ... an insurer does not have to look beyond the words of the
complaint to determine if a possibility of coverage exists.").) In Hoyle, the insured argued that
the facts behind the complaint filed in the underlying action potentially gave rise to an action for
negligence and, therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend. Id., 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at
1262. This Court rejected that argument and held that whether the complaint gives rise to a
potential for liability under the insurance policy is determined exclusively by the facts and claims
8

alleged in the complaint. Id. See also AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Investment Co., 140 Idaho
733, 738, 101 P.3d 226, 231 (2004) (holding that even if the facts behind a complaint may give
rise to a covered claim, such facts are irrelevant to an insurer's duty to defend).
(2)

The Test for Determining the Potential for Liability Under the
Policy Does Not Change When an Exclusion is Involved.

Scout argues, however, that the Four Corners Doctrine for determining whether there is a
duty to defend is a two-step process: ( 1) the OBC Complaint allegations must be construed
broadly when examining the insuring language in the policy to determine if there is any potential
for coverage; and (2) the OBC Complaint allegations must then be construed narrowly to
determine whether an exclusion to coverage applies. The District Court erred, argues Scout,
because it broadly construed the OBC Complaint when it applied the Prior Publication exclusion.
There is no such two-step process. In Idaho, the complaint is read broadly for all
purposes in determining whether there is a potential for liability under the Policy. This holistic
approach requires comparing a broad reading of the OBC Complaint to the Policy as a whole to
determine if there is a potential for liability under the Policy. This broad reading of the
complaint generally favors the insured. As this Court has previously held:
The problem that faces the insurers when a claim is made is determining if there
is a potential for liability. However, ... since the advent of notice pleading there
will likely be broad ambiguous claims made against the insured making it more
difficult for the insurer to determine whether the insurance policy covers the
claims ....

Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 372, 48 P.3d at 1265, quoting Kootenai County v. Western Cas. and Sur.
Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910-11, 750 P.2d 87, 89-90. But, when a broad reading of the Complaint
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reveals no potential for liability under the policy as a whole, including exclusions, an insurer has
no duty to defend the excluded claims. See Construction Mgt. System v. Assurance Co. of
America, 135 Idaho 680, 683, 23 P.3d 142, 145 (2001). The District Court properly applied the
Four Corners Doctrine.
(3)

There is No Dispute Over Any Facts Alleged in the OBC
Complaint that Bear on Whether the Prior Publication Exclusion
Applies.

The Policy excludes coverage for advertising injury "[a]rising out of oral or written
publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy
period". (R., p. 234.) (Appendix B.) The only facts bearing on coverage are those alleged in the
OBC Complaint. The inquiry is thereby limited to whether the OBC Complaint alleges: (1) an
advertising injury; (2) when the infringing material was first published; and (3) when the Policy
period began. If the allegations in the OBC Complaint allege an advertising injury and that
Scout began using OBC' s Rogue mark before the Policy period, there is no genuine dispute over
the facts bearing on coverage.
An "advertising injury" is an injury arising out of a misappropriation of advertising ideas
or style or an infringement of copyright, title or slogan. (R., p. 239.) The OBC Complaint
alleges an advertising injury. (R., p. 49 (<J[ 1 - "[t]his is an action for trademark counterfeiting,
trademark infringement ... "); pp. 51-52 (<J[ 14-Scout "created a Facebook page ... and began
marketing and advertising the ROGUE restaurant and bar ... including using photographs of
people partaking in alcoholic beverages, using beverage glassware and coasters containing the
mark ROGUE, wearing clothing containing the mark ROGUE, depicting beer taps for various
10

beers on tap at Gone Rogue Pub ... "); p. 52 ('I[ 16 - "OBC ... called one of [Scout's] owners ...
and explained that their conduct infringed OBC's federally registered trademarks."); p. 53 ('I[ 18
- "Defendants' conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake and/or deception as to the
affiliation, connection or association of Defendants with OBC and as to whether OBC approves,
sponsors or endorses Defendants' services."); p. 53 ('I[ 19 - "Defendants' conduct constitutes
intentional and deliberate trademark counterfeiting and infringement. Defendants used OBC's
ROGUE mark with the intention of trading on the good will and reputation of OBC's mark."); p.
53, ('I[ 20 - "Unless enjoined, Defendants' continued unlawful conduct will irreparably injure
OBC .... ").)
The OBC Complaint alleges when the infringing mark was first published. The OBC
Complaint specifically states that "[i]n October 2012 ... [Scout] commenced use of the mark
ROGUE in the name of their restaurant and bar ('Gone Rogue Pub')." (R., p. 51, 'I[ 14.) The
attachments to the OBC Complaint include photos with "comments" by third parties that predate
November 7, 2012 (some dating back to August 2012). (R., pp. 126, 128 and 130.) Also
attached to the OBC Complaint is the October Post, a printed screenshot from Gone Rogue Pub's
Facebook page posting an image of their logo using the ROGUE mark with the statement "Here
is our new logo! Signs are going up today and tomorrow! Hope everyone likes it! Let us know
what you think!" (R., p. 131.) Three comments on the logo are dated October 11, 2012. (Id.)
The allegations in the OBC Complaint clearly fix October 2012 (if not earlier) as the start date of
Scout's publishing material using the ROGUE mark.

11

The Policy period began on November 7, 2012. (R., pp. 162, 165 and 171.) It is
undisputed that Scout first published material using the ROGUE mark before the Policy period
began.
An example of a dispute over facts bear on coverage in the context of this matter would
be if the OBC Complaint did not allege a date of first publication at all, or if it alleged
inconsistent dates (e.g., October 2012 and December 2012). Then the facts bearing on coverage
would be disputed and Truck would be required to provide a defense, at least until the dispute
over the facts was resolved. But, no such dispute exists here. The Complaint expressly and
specifically alleges an advertising injury beginning with the wrongful use of the ROGUE mark
prior to the Policy and continued use of that same mark after the Policy. Had, under the
scenarios described above, the District Court selected an alleged date that favored no coverage
over an alleged date that favored coverage, there may have been error. Had the District Court
looked behind the Complaint to determine when the infringing publication was first published,
there may have been error. Here, however, there was no need to construe, interpret, or select
facts within the Complaint, or otherwise examine facts outside the Complaint because the
Complaint clearly set forth a single date when first publication occurred.
The only facts that can be considered in determining whether there is a duty to defend are
those facts alleged in the OBC Complaint. There is no dispute that the OBC Complaint alleged
an advertising injury that arose out of allegedly infringing material first published before the
beginning of the Policy period. These facts bearing on coverage are not in dispute. Under Idaho
law, the analysis of the facts bearing on coverage should end here.
12

(4)

Scout Cannot Create a Genuine Dispute Over the Facts Bearing on
Coverage by Looking at Facts Outside the OBC Complaint.

Scout attempts to create a dispute over the facts bearing on coverage by looking to facts
outside of the Complaint. Scout argues that the Prior Publication exclusion does not apply
because facts outside the Complaint show that the alleged advertising injury was not actionable
or injurious when made and was not the same injury caused by subsequent publications.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-31.) Scout asked the District Court to consider that Gone Rogue Pub,
at the time it first published the ROGUE mark, was not yet open or operating as a pub, had not
yet received necessary licenses or permits and was not yet selling beer, ale, glassware or
clothing. (Id.) These facts are not alleged in the OBC Complaint and cannot be considered as
facts bearing on coverage or considered in determining whether there is a potential for liability
under the Policy. The District Court did not err by not considering these facts in granting
summary judgment. 2
b.

There is No Genuine Dispute Over Application of the Policy's Language
to the Undisputed Facts Bearing on Coverage.

Scout argues that because there is a split of authority in other jurisdictions over the
interpretation and application of the Prior Publication exclusion, it is not clear and unambiguous
and that the Prior Publication exclusion is susceptible to differing interpretations in the
circumstances of this matter.

The District Court did, alternatively, consider the facts outside of the OBC Complaint but held
that even if they were considered there was no potential for liability under the Policy. (R., pp.
607,608,610, 611-12.)

2
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An insurer has a duty to defend if there is "a genuine dispute over the application of the
policy's language to the facts." DeLuna v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 149 Idaho 81, 84,233
P.3d 12, 15 (2008). A split of authority or differing potential interpretations does not create a
genuine dispute over the application of the Policy language to the specific facts alleged in the
underlying complaint. There is no requirement, when interpreting an insurance policy, that the
Court must adopt case law most favorable to an insured. The Court is only obligated to apply the
correct law when examining legal issues in the context of the particular facts bearing on
coverage. The District Court properly found that the Prior Publication exclusion was clear and
unambiguous and only required that the advertising injury arise out of the prior publication.
Regardless, the undisputed facts bearing on coverage (those alleged in the OBC
Complaint) show that the Prior Publication exclusion provides no potential for liability under the
Policy regardless of which differing interpretation is adopted when applied to this case. The
OBC Complaint alleges injury from the prior publication of the Rogue mark, that the prior
publication violated all five trademarks, that the prior publication was the basis for each separate
tort alleged in the OBC Complaint and that the prior publication infringement was a continuing
infringement through to and including at least nearly two years after the Policy was issued. (R.,
pp. 51-54, <JI<![ 14, 17, 24, 25.)
While the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the duty to defend is not
absolute. Black v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 449,455, 767 P.2d 824, 830
(Ct.App. 1989). If the facts and claims alleged in an action filed against an insured trigger the
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•

application of a clear and unambiguous exclusion from coverage, the insurer has no duty to
defend the insured. Construction Mgt., 135 Idaho at 684, 23 P.3d at 146.
In Construction Mgt., this Court held that a commercial general liability insurer had no
duty to defend its insured against a claim of copyright infringement. The Court stated that "the
insurer may not be required to defend if it can establish that the exclusion contained in the policy
is clear and unambiguous." Construction Mgt., 135 Idaho at 684, 23 P.2d at 146. See also

AMCO Ins. Co., 140 Idaho at 738-9, 101 P.3d at 231-2 (holding that a policy exclusion negated
an insurer's duty to defend a sexual harassment complaint). Therefore, if the Prior Publication
exclusion clearly and unambiguously applies to the undisputed facts alleged in the OBC
Complaint, there is no duty to defend. See Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 1262 (the policy's
intentional act exclusion negated the insurer's duty to defend the claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing). As discussed above, the facts alleged in the OBC
Complaint are not disputed. As discussed below, the application of the Prior Publication
exclusion to the facts is also not disputed.
(1)

The Prior Publication Exclusion is Clear and Unambiguous.

The test for determining whether policy language is clear and unambiguous is set forth in

Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 115 P.3d 751 (2005):
In interpreting an insurance policy, "where the policy language is clear and
unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as a matter of law, according to
the plain meaning of the words used." . . . In construing an insurance policy,
the Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are
any ambiguities. This determination is a question of law.
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Id., 141 Idaho at 662-63, 115 P.3d at 753-54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A court, by
construction, cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer, or make a new contract for the
parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to
create or avoid liability. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69, 205 P.3d
1203, 1205 (2009). In deciding whether a particular provision is ambiguous, the provision must
be read within the context in which it occurs in the policy. Id., 147 Idaho at 70, 205 P.3d at
1206. The District Court correctly placed the burden on Truck to use clear and precise language
if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage. (R., p. 606 (quoting Arreguin v. Farmers Ins.

Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,461, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008).) The District Court correctly
recognized that a provision that seeks to exclude coverage must be strictly construed in favor of
the insured. Id.
The identical Prior Publication exclusion has been held by other courts to be clear and
unambiguous. 3 (See e.g., United National Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, 555 F.3d 772, 777
(9th Cir. 2009) ("Plainly reading the first publication exclusion and the relevant advertising
injury definition together indicates that the parties intended it to exclude from coverage any
copyright infringement injury that arose from an oral or written publication of material first
published before the policy became effective."); Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Elstone Self-Service

Wholesale Groceries, Inc., 559 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2009) ("We do not see any ambiguity in
the meaning of the [Prior Publication] exclusion; it seems clear that the exclusion ... abrogates

3

Neither the parties nor the District Court were able to locate an Idaho appellate court decision
interpreting the Prior Publication exclusion.
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the duty to defend where the insured's first publication of actionable material occurred prior to
the beginning of its policy").
(2)

Application of the Clear and Unambiguous Prior Publication
Exclusion to the Undisputed Facts Shows No Potential for
Liability Under the Policy.

The Prior Publication exclusion is included in a liability insurance policy to insulate an
insurer from providing coverage for a risk that arose before the policy was issued:
The Policy's prior publication exclusion exempts from coverage '[p]ersonal and
advertising injury' arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first
publication took place before the beginning of the policy period. The
straightforward purpose of this exclusion is to 'bar coverage' when the 'wrongful
behavior ... [began] prior to the effective date of the insurance policy'.
Street Swfing, LLC v. Great American E & S Ins. Co., 776 F.3d 603,610 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, as in Street Surfing, the Policy excludes coverage for
advertising injury "arising out of' the publication of material whose first publication took place
before the policy became effective. (R., p. 234.) "Arise" is defined as "to come into being,
action or notice; originate; appear; spring up." http:\\www.dictionary.com/browse/arising. The
phrase "arising out of' as used in insurance policy has been interpreted to mean "originating
from" or "growing out of' or "flowing from" or "done in connection with" - "that is, it requires
some causal connection to the injuries suffered, but does not require proximate cause in the legal
sense." Federal Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 1998). 4

See also Hugenberg v. West Am. Ins. Co./Ohio Cas. Group, 249 S.W.3d 174, 186 (Ky. Ct. App.
2006) ("arising out of" means "originating from, or having its origin in, growing out of or
flowing from"); Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 539
(Fla. 2005) ("arising out of' as used in a Commercial General Liability policy exclusion is

4
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The Prior Publication exclusion thereby precludes coverage of the chance that advertising
injuries will materialize from the pre-policy publication of allegedly infringing material. "Risk"
is defined as "exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance."
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/risk. "Materialize" is defined as "to come into perceptible
existence; appear; become actual or real." http://www.dictonary.com/browse/materialize. Taco
Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he purpose
of insurance is to spread risk - such as the risk that an advertising campaign might be deemed
tortious - and if the risk has already materialized, what is there to insure?") (internal citation
omitted). Kim Seng Co. v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 179 Cal.App. 4th 1030, 1044,
101 Cal. Rptr.3d 537, 548 (2009) ("The purpose of the prior publication exclusion is to preclude
coverage for risks that have already materialized .... ).
The chance of an advertising injury arising out of Scout's use of the ROGUE mark in the
Gone Rogue Pub name and logo came into existence in October 2012 (at the latest). The OBC
Complaint alleges that Scout's use of the Gone Rogue Pub name and logo was continuous from
at least as early as October 2012, until the OBC Complaint was filed on October 14, 2014. (R.,
pp. 48, 51.) That there was a risk of advertising injury created by Scout's pre-policy publication
of the Rogue mark is proven by the complaint allegation that OBC contacted Scout just two

unambiguous and broader in meaning than the term "caused by" and means "originating from,"
"having its origin in," "growing out of," "flowing from," "incident to" or "having a connection
with"); Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 559 N.W.2d 411,419 (Minn. 1997) ("arising
out of' in a Commercial General Liability insurance policy exclusion means "causally connected
with" and not "proximately caused by"); accord Records v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins., 683 A.2d 834
(N.J. Super. 1996), American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998).
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months after it opened the Gone Rogue Pub and explained that Scout's "conduct infringed
OBC's federally registered trademarks." (R., p. 52, <J[ 16.) Based on the clear and unambiguous
terms and the purpose of the Prior Publication exclusion and applying that language to the
undisputed facts bearing on coverage, the claims alleged in the OBC Complaint were excluded,
there was no potential for liability under the Policy, and there was no duty to defend.
Scout argues that the District Court erred in finding that the Prior Publication exclusion
unambiguously excluded coverage because the language of the exclusion does not have a
"settled legal meaning" because other courts have interpreted or applied the language differently.
Scout argues that because there is a split of authority the District Court was required to accept
the holdings of those courts that favored Scout. This is not the proper standard for determining
whether there is a dispute over the application of the policy's language to the facts requiring a
duty to defend. The District Court is required to apply the law correctly, not to apply the law
that favors one party over the other. The District Court did so here when it distinguished those
cases Scout felt favored its position on either the facts, the law or both.
In addition, Scout argues that the term "publication of material" in the Prior Publication
exclusion is susceptible to at least two differing interpretations when applied to the facts of this
case and the District Court erred when it did not adopt an interpretation that required the prior
publication to be actionable (injurious when published) or cause the same harm as subsequent
publications. The District Court properly adopted the legally correct interpretation of the
exclusion. The District Court also properly held that no matter the interpretation, the exclusion
eliminated any potential for liability under the Policy.
19

First, the District Court did not err in its application of the case law to the Policy
language and the facts bearing on coverage. That the District Court can properly find the Prior
Publication exclusion to be unambiguous as applied to the circumstances and facts of the present
case, even though other Courts have found the exclusion to be ambiguous, is proved by case law
relied on by Scout to support its differing interpretation of the exclusion. The Court in
Transportation Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturer Assoc. Ins. Co., 346 Fed.Appx., 862, 863
(3rd Cir. 2009) held:
Although the "prior publication" exclusion has been considered ambiguous in
other circumstances, it is not ambiguous in the circumstances before us. Because
the underlying complaint clearly states that all of the relevant injurious conduct
began in August 1999 - more than six months before the ... policy period
commenced.
Id. at 863. The Third Circuit determined that the exclusion was not ambiguous in those
situations when the underlying complaint alleges that the relevant conduct began before the
Policy period even though the exclusion might be ambiguous in other situations. That is the
situation here - the alleged wrongful conduct began in October 2012, before the Policy period
began on November 7, 2012 and therefore the Prior Publication exclusion is not ambiguous. See
also Applied Bolting Technology Products Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 942
F.Supp. 1029, 1036-37 (E. D. PA 1996) (citations omitted) ("Under the exclusion's plain terms,
the 'first publication' date is a landmark: if the injurious advertisement was 'first published'
before the policy coverage began, then coverage for the 'advertising injury' is excluded. It is
irrelevant that later publications, made after the policy became effective, also caused 'advertising
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injury' or increased the damages."). 5 In the present case, the first publication (landmark) date is
October 2012. Scout's alleged wrongful use of the ROGUE mark in its advertisement was first
published before the Policy coverage began on November 7, 2012. It is irrelevant to the
coverage determination that later publications also caused advertising injury or increased the
damages. Here, under the exclusion's plain terms, there is no potential for liability under the
Policy and therefore no duty to defend.
The District Court properly distinguished Capitol Indemnity's interpretation of the
exclusion because, under Idaho law, a court must apply the policy according to its plain language
and not add words to either create or avoid liability. (R., p. 608.) (citing Armstrong, 147 Idaho at
69-70, 205 P.3d at 1205-06.) The Prior Publication exclusion does contain the words
"actionable" or "injurious". Instead, the exclusion applies where the advertising injury "arises
out of' the first publication of the infringing material. The District Court examined the plain
meaning of the phrase "arising out of' and the case law treatment of that phrase as used in
insurance policies and determined that the Prior Publication exclusion did not require the first
publication of material be independently "actionable" or "injurious" for the exclusion to apply.
(R., p. 608.)

Rather, it need be causally connected to the advertising injuries alleged. Stated
another way, the advertising injuries alleged must flow from the first publication,
but the first publication need not be the proximate cause of the injuries. To
construe the provision as requiring that the first publication be independently
injurious or actionable would not only ignore the common definition of "arising
out of' but would also insert words where they do not appear, which is contrary to
The fact that these Courts used the term "injurious" did not change the interpretation of the
exclusion or make it ambiguous in the circumstances of those cases.
5
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Idaho's rules of contract interpretation. For this reason, the court does not find
Scout's interpretation reasonable and, therefore, does not find the exclusion
ambiguous for the reasons cited by Scout.
(R., pp. 608-609.)

The District Court also properly distinguished Capitol Indemnity's application of the
Prior Publication exclusion to the facts in that case:
Capitol Indemnity involved a suit for trademark infringement based on the
defendant's sale of counterfeit cigarettes displaying the Newport trademark. 559
F.3d at 619-20. Prior to the effective date of the policy, the defendant sold
genuine Newport cigarettes with packaging and wrapping displaying the Newport
marks. After the policy went into effect, however, the defendant began selling
counterfeit cigarettes in the same packaging. Id. The insurer argued that the Prior
Publication exclusion barred coverage - and, therefore abrogated its duty to
defend - because the cigarette packaging and wrapping containing the Newport
marks was first "published" before the policy began. Id. at 620. The court
disagreed because the pre-policy publication was not actionable - the defendant
was actually selling genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. The infringement alleged in
the underlying complaint was the defendant's sale of counte,feit cigarettes with
Newport packaging, not the sale of genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. at 619. By
contrast, OBC alleged that Scout's pre-policy publication of the Gone Rogue Pub
logo in October of 2012 marked the origination date of Scout's acts that resulted
in the infringement.
(R., pp. 609-610.)

The District Court then properly analyzed and relied on that case law which was
consistent with Idaho's rules of construction. For instance, in Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v.
Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Tex. 2000), Plaintiff Matagorda Ventures
sought a declaration that its insurer, Travelers, owed a duty to defend it in a trademark and
copyright infringement lawsuit brought by Movado Group. Matagorda, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
Travelers, relying on an identical Prior Publication exclusion, moved for summary judgment on
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the basis that the material from which Movado's infringement claims against Matagorda arose
was published on Matagorda's website prior to the date the policy was issued. Id. at 712. The
District Court granted summary judgment to Travelers. Id.
Like Scout, Matagorda argued that the Prior Publication exclusion did not apply because
Movado's claims for infringement were not actionable until after the policy was issued because
some of the copyrights allegedly infringed upon were not registered when the prior publications
took place and therefore the prior publications were not infringing, thereby triggering Traveler's
duty to defend the entire suit. Id. at 717-718. The appellate court rejected this argument. Id.
The Court held that when an infringement claim becomes actionable is irrelevant under the plain
language of the Prior Publication exclusion. Id. The only relevant inquiry is whether the
infringement claim arose from material published before the policy period began:
The relevant question for the exclusion, however, is not when the claim first
became actionable, but when the material giving rise to the claim was first
published. The copyright infringement claim arose from "material whose first
publication took place before the beginning of the policy period."
Id. The Matagorda court's holding is consistent with the plain language of the Truck Policy and

was properly adopted by the District Court. When the actual infringement does or does not
occur is irrelevant to application of the Prior Publication exclusion if the alleged advertising
injury arises from a pre-policy publication. 6
Further, support for the District Court's holding is found in Kim Seng Co. v. Great
American Ins. Co. of New York, 179 Cal.App.4th 1030, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 (2009), as modified
6

under the relevant facts bearing on coverage (those in the OBC Complaint), the infringement
began before the Policy and the advertising injuries arose out of that prior publication.
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on denial of reh 'g (Dec. 7, 2009). There, the insured argued that the Court should consider

whether its pre-policy publication gave rise to the "likelihood of confusion" and constituted
infringement when it was made. Kim Seng Co., 179 Cal. App. at 1043, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 54 7.
The Court held "[w]e do not deal with whether there was an infringement, but rather whether
there is coverage." Id. Likewise, here, whether the October 2012 Facebook post did or did not
infringe on OBC's marks when it was published is irrelevant to coverage. Only whether the
advertising injury alleged in the OBC Complaint arose out of Scout's October 2012 use of the
"Gone Rogue Pub" name and logo. It did.
Second, even accepting Scout's argument that the Prior Publication exclusion is
ambiguous and susceptible to differing interpretations and required the "publication of material"
to be injurious or cause the same harm, the District Court found that the facts bearing on
coverage in the OBC Complaint demonstrated that there was no dispute that the publication of
the material was injurious and caused the same harm.
Here, the OBC Complaint alleges that Scout's use of the "ROGUE" mark was
unauthorized, the use commenced in October of 2012, and the use caused OBC
harm. Thus, the OBC Complaint asserts a continuing course of infringing and
injurious conduct since prior to the effective date of the policy. Whether or not
Scout's October Post was actually injurious because Gone Rogue Pub was not yet
opened for business is not germane to the inquiry since injury beginning in
October of 2012 was clearly alleged in the OBC Complaint.
(R., p. 607.) The analysis need go no further. Even under Scout's proposed interpretation, the

District Court alternatively applied the case law "favorable" to Scout in construing the terms of
the Prior Publication exclusion, and interpreted that exclusion as if it were ambiguous and
determined, based on the allegations in the OBC Complaint (the only relevant facts that bear on
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coverage) that the advertising injury claims alleged against Scout did not give rise to the
potential for liability under the Policy. See Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho
415,419,234 P.3d 739, 743 (2010) (the District Court acknowledged that the phrase "residents
of your household" is potentially ambiguous but found that sufficient evidence was presented to
demonstrate that Jamey was not a resident of the household in spite of any ambiguity).
c.

There are No Genuine Disputes Over Facts Bearing on Coverage or
Genuine Disputes Over Application of the Prior Publication Exclusion to
Those Facts; Therefore, There is No Potential for Liability Under the
Policy for All Claims Alleged in the OBC Lawsuit.

Scout argues that the District Court erred in finding that the October Post excluded
coverage of all claims alleged in the OBC Complaint. Specifically, Scout argues that the OBC
Complaint alleges five separate torts based on five different trademarks and that Truck must
show that the prior publication constituted a violation of each tort and a violation of all five
trademarks. At most, argues Scout, the October Post violates only one trademark (for restaurant,
pub and catering services) but did not violate the other trademarks. Scout contends that use of
the Rogue mark on glassware, clothing, beer and ale did not relate to (or arise out of) its prior
publication of the identical Rogue mark in the Gone Rogue Pub name and logo. Scout contends
that these uses constitute "fresh wrongs" to which the Prior Publication exclusion does not apply.
The entirety of Scout's argument relies on examining facts outside of the OBC
Complaint. In other words, Scout cannot even argue that there were later publications of the
Rogue mark that were "fresh wrongs" without looking behind the OBC Complaint. In addition,
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the case law relied on by Scout to create these "fresh wrongs" is either contrary to its position or
factually distinguishable.
Scout creates so-called "fresh wrongs" and "later uses" of the Rogue mark by pointing to
facts outside of the OBC Complaint that Gone Rogue Pub was not yet open, was not yet selling
beer or ale, and was not yet selling glassware or clothing when the first publication of the mark
was made and before the Policy became effective. Therefore, Scout claims, any infringement on
four of the five trademarks could not have occurred until after the Policy was issued. There are
no allegations in the OBC Complaint that Gone Rogue Pub was not yet open or that it was not
selling beer, ale or merchandise when the first publication occurred or until after the Policy was
issued. There are no allegations of post-policy uses of the Rogue mark that caused separate,
distinct and fresh wrongs or that there were different post-policy infringements from the prepolicy infringements. The District Court correctly held that "Scout's argument relies on facts
outside of the allegations of the OBC Complaint, which is irrelevant in considering whether an
insurer has a duty to defend. Rather, as discussed above, the duty to defend is framed solely by
the allegations of the underlying complaint." (R., p. 607.) The Complaint alleges a single
continuing wrong based on the pre-policy publication with all advertising injuries arising out of
that pre-policy publication. There are no facts bearing on coverage (within the four corners of
the OBC Complaint) to support "fresh wrongs" to which the Prior Publication exclusion does not
apply.
Regardless, case law supports that whatever later uses were made of the ROGUE mark,
they were not "fresh wrongs". The Ninth Circuit held that when there is a publication of material
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prior to policy issuance and the insured continues to publish the same material after policy
issuance, the publications are part of a "single, continuing wrong" dating back to before the
policy took effect, triggering application of the Prior Publication exclusion. Street Swfing LLC,
776 F.3d at 610.

In the context of advertising injury coverage, an allegedly wrongful advertisement
published before the coverage period triggers application of the prior publication
exclusion .... If this threshold showing is made, the exclusion bars coverage of
injuries arising out of republication of that advertisement, or any substantially
similar advertisement, during the policy period, because such later publications
are part of a single, continuing wrong that began before the insurance policy went
into effect.

Id. (emphasis added). In Street Su,fing, there was a single pre-policy publication of a logo "for
the purpose of attracting future customers who might like what they saw ... " and later
publications on other products. Nevertheless, the Prior Publication exclusion applied. Id. at 612.
The determination to be made here is whether the OBC Complaint alleges Scout's continued use
of the same or substantially similar Rogue mark before and after the policy effective date. The
OBC Complaint unambiguously does so. (R., pp. 51-54.) The Prior Publication exclusion
applies.
In Street Su,fing, the infringer initially sold skateboards affixed with a particular Street
Surfing logo. Id. at 606. After obtaining insurance, Street Surfing expanded its product line to
skateboard accessories, also affixed with the Street Surfing logo. Ultimately, Street Surfing was
sued by the owner of the mark and Street Surfing's insurer declined to defend based on the Prior
Publication exclusion. Id. Street Surfing sued its insurer, arguing inter alia, that its pre-policy
publication of the logo was not substantially similar to the post-policy advertisements because
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they were affixed to different products. Id. at 612-13. The Street Su,fing Court disagreed for
two reasons. First, the underlying complaint did not charge the misappropriations as separate
torts depending on the specific advertisements. Rather, it generally alleged that Street Surfing
infringed on the mark by using the same name and logo on its products, without making any
distinction between the types of products. Id. at 614. Second, although the advertisements
featured different products, the court found it was not a "material distinction", because the
advertising idea being used was the same regardless of the product: the products all used the
allegedly infringing identification "Street Surfing." Id.
Here, the OBC Complaint did not charge the infringements as separate torts depending on
whether the logo appeared on a sign, glassware, clothing, beer or ale. Rather, the OBC
Complaint alleged that Scout infringed on the mark by using the same name and logo to
advertise and market before and continued to do so after the Policy without making any
distinction between what sign or product the name and logo was on. Scout used the same name
and logo regardless of the product: the products all used the allegedly infringing Rogue mark in
the name and logo.
Likewise, in Hanover Ins. Co. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 806 F.3d 761 (3rd Cir. 2015),
Hanover sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend its insured, Urban
Outfitters, in an underlying trademark infringement action brought against Urban Outfitters by
the Navajo Nation. The underlying trademark action complaint alleged that Urban Outfitters had
been advertising, promoting and selling goods under the Navajo name and marks since at least
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March 16, 2009. Id. at 763. Urban Outfitters, like Scout, tendered the defense of the trademark
action to Hanover Insurance. Id. at 766.
Hanover first issued a commercial general liability policy to Urban Outfitters on July 7,
2010. Id. at 764. The policy's Prior Publication exclusion was identical to that in Truck's Policy.
Id. Holding that Hanover had no duty to defend Urban Outfitters, the Third Circuit stated:

In each instance, Navajo Nation fixed March 16, 2009 (if not earlier) as a start
date for Urban Outfitters' alleged misconduct. Under the terms of the Hanover
policies' "prior publication" exclusions, we must treat this date of "first
publication" as a landmark. Because Hanover was not responsible for Urban
Outfitters' liability insurance coverage until sixteen months thereafter, the
exclusions apply.
Id. at 767. See also United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th

Cir. 2009), (holding that because the insured's first publication of infringing material was prior
to the policy inception date, the Prior Publication exclusion applied and there was no duty to
defend the insured).
Further support is again found in Matagorda. Matagorda argued in that case, like Scout
does in this appeal, that the Prior Publication exclusion only applied to some of the claims
alleged in the underlying trademark infringement lawsuit and not others and therefore Traveler's
duty to defend the entire suit was triggered. Matagorda, 203 F.Supp.2d at 717-178. The
Matagorda court rejected this argument, finding that all of the infringement claims were based

on material first published on Matagorda's website before the policy inception date.
Second, plaintiffs argue that even if the "first publication" exclusion applies to
some of the Movado Group claims, other Movado Group claims are not subject to
the exclusion, triggering the duty to defend. If some of the causes of action
alleged in the Movado Group suit were not subject to the exclusion or otherwise
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outside the scope of coverage, Travelers would have a duty to defend the entire
lawsuit. However, all the causes of action asserted in the Movado Group
complaint arose from the content of, and information posted on, the
wristwatch.com web site. The material of the web site constitutes the "written
material" first published before the beginning of the policy period. All of the
Movado Group claims are subject to the exclusion. Travelers owes plaintiffs no
duty to defend.

Matagorda, 203 F.Supp.2d at 718. (internal citation omitted.) Likewise, the OBC Complaint
alleges that all of the violations and causes of action originated with and arose out of Scout's
undisputed use of the Rogue mark in October 2012.
The District Court properly distinguished Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004) on the grounds that unlike in Taco Bell, the OBC Complaint did
not charge separate torts based on uses prior to the Policy period versus during the Policy period
and that there was no thematic difference between the alleged publications here as there was in

Taco Bell. (R., p. 612.) The District Court held "[r]ather, as in Street Swfing, Scout's
publications all arise from [the] same single, continuous use [of] the word 'ROGUE' in
advertising Gone Rogue Pub, which is an appropriation of OBC's advertising idea [and]
[t]herefore, Scout's post-[policy] effective date uses of the mark are not 'fresh wrongs' which
avoid the application of the Prior Publication exclusion." (Id.)

It is undisputed that the Complaint alleges that Scout published the Gone Rogue Pub logo
and name on Facebook in October 2012 for the express purpose of advertising and marketing.
Scout thereafter engaged in a "single, continuing wrong" by continuously using the same Gone
Rogue Pub name and logo at least until the OBC complaint was filed on October 14, 2014. Like

Street Swfing, Scout continued to use the same Gone Rogue Pub name and logo in violation of
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all of the trademarks. The OBC Complaint did not allege separate legal violations for each
infringing use of the Rogue mark by Scout; rather, it alleged legal violations that all originated
with the first use of the "Gone Rogue Pub" name and logo in October 2012. These continuous
violations are not "fresh wrongs" and the Prior Publication exclusion applies to negate coverage
for all claims alleged against Scout in the OBC Complaint.

2.

Without Coverage There Can Be No Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing or Bad Faith; the District Court Properly
Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing Breach of the Implied Covenant
and Bad Faith.

Scout requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment
dismissing the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith claims
and to adjudicate those claims and find that Truck actually breached the implied covenant and is
liable for bad faith. As discussed below, this Court can only reverse dismissal of breach of the
implied covenant and bad faith if it reverses dismissal of the breach of contract claim. Even if
this Court reverses dismissal of the breach of contract claim, it cannot, as requested by Scout,
adjudicate those claims in this appeal or affirmatively determine that Truck breached the implied
covenant or is liable for bad faith.
a.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Breach of the Implied Covenant.

The District Court properly dismissed the breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing when it determined there was no coverage, no duty to defend, and, therefore, no
breach of contract. An implied duty of good faith and fair dealing "exists between insurers and
insureds in every insurance policy." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 445,
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235 P.3d 387, 395 (2010). The covenant requires that "the parties perform in good faith the
obligations imposed by their agreement," and a violation of the covenant occurs only when
"either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit" of the contract. Idaho

First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,288,824 P.2d 841,863 (1991). If there has
been no breach of contract, however, there can be no impairment of any benefit under the contract
and therefore no breach of an implied covenant. Id. Likewise, when there is no coverage under an
insurance policy, there can be no breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Rizza v. State

Farm Ins. Co., 155 Idaho 75, 84,305 P.3d 519,528 (2013) (holding that if no benefit of the
policy has been violated, nullified, or significantly impaired by the insurer's actions, there was no
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.) Because there is no breach of the insurance
contract, there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter
of law.
b.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Bad Faith.

A predicate to an action for bad faith is a covered claim and a breach of the insurance
contract. "Fundamental to the claim of bad faith is the idea that there must be coverage of the
claim under the policy." Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 176, 45
P.3d 829, 832 (2002). The existence of a breach of a contractual duty is essential to the cause of
action for bad faith. Robinson, 137 Idaho at 179, 45 P.3d at 835. "The duty in tort is founded
upon contract and the existence of a breach of the contractual duty is essential to the cause of
action in tort. The duty is in contract, the damages in tort." Id. The tort of bad faith cannot exist
without a breach of a duty under the insurance contract. See Id. See also Rizzo, supra, 155
32

Idaho at 84, P.3d at 528 (holding that the insurer did not commit bad faith because there was no
coverage under the policy.) Because there is no coverage under the Policy, there can be no bad
faith as a matter of law.
Even if the Court reverses the District Court's dismissal of breach of contract, the Court
cannot adjudicate whether Truck breached the implied covenant or is liable for bad faith. First,
the District Court did not address the merits of these claims and therefore the merits are not ripe
for review by this Court. See State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290,295, 62 P.3d 214, 219 (Ct.App.
2003). ("Where a district court has not ruled on an issue, it is not ripe for review and should be
dismissed.")
Second, Scout is asking this Court to review the District Court's denial of its cross
motion for summary judgment. It is well settled in Idaho that "[a]n order denying a motion for
summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which no direct appeal may be taken."
Dominguez, ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen R.E.S., Inc. 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005)
(citation omitted). This rule is not altered by entry of an appealable final judgment. Id.
Consequently, Scout's arguments in its Appellant's Brief that Truck is liable for breach of the
implied covenant and bad faith are not relevant to the issues on appeal and should be stricken or
ignored. 7

It should be noted that Scout claims that Truck breached the duty of good faith and acted in bad
faith based on one of the alternative grounds for denying the duty to defend - that Scout, LLC
was not listed as a named insured. It remains undisputed that Scout was not a named insured
under the policy. (R., p. 165.) Regardless, breach of the duty of good faith and a claim for bad
faith cannot arise from the insurer's actions when underwriting a policy (i.e., failing to identify
Scout as the actual insured or having knowledge of Scout's association with Gone Rogue Pub).

7
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The District Court properly dismissed breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and bad faith because there was no coverage or breach of contract.
3.

Scout is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees, Even if it Prevails on Appeal.

Scout requests an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839( 1) if it is
the prevailing party. 8 Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) allows for attorney fees when an insurer fails to
pay an insured within a specified period of time "the amount that person is justly due under such
policy." Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). Scout is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under this
section because there has been no determination of an "amount justly due" as required by this
statute. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 601, 990 P.2d 1204, 1212 (1999). 9

See Simper v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 132 Idaho 471, 474, 974 P.2d 1100, 1103
(1999). Consequently, there was no breach of the duty of good faith and Truck did not act in bad
faith for raising the fact that Scout was not a "named insured" as one of several grounds for
denying the claims (including that the claims were excluded by the Prior Publication exclusion).
Scout also requests that this Court award attorney fees and costs incurred in the proceedings
before the District Court. There were no attorney fees requested by either party in the District
Court. There was no determination by the District Court relating to attorney fees. The issue of
Scout's entitlement to attorney fees incurred below is not a proper issue on appeal because the
District Court did not make a determination that Scout was the prevailing party (it was not) or
determine an amount of attorney fees or costs to be awarded.
8

9

Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) also allows an award of attorney fees when a case is brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Scout has not requested attorney
fees on appeal under this section. Nor could it, since, as the prevailing party below, Truck is
merely defending on appeal its win in the District Court.
34

IV. CONCLUSION
This appeal should be denied. The District Court's grant of summary judgment
dismissing the complaint should be affirmed. Scout's request for attorney fees on appeal should
be denied.
DATED this

i

day of March, 2018.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:
omson, Of the firm
t rneys for Respondent
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Appendix A: OBC Complaint, without exhibits (except for Facebook October
Post, filed in Oregon Brewing Company v. Scout, LLC, Case No.
14-cv-0043*9-CWD, U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. ofldaho (R., pp. 48-50,
131).
Appendix B: Relevant excerpts from Businessowner's insurance policy (R., pp.
162,229,231,234,239) (emphasis added).
Appendix C: Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, filed July 13, 2017 (R., pp. 595-613).
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Dana M. Herberholz, ISB No. 7440
Maria 0. Hart, ISB No. 8979
PARSONS BEHLE& LATIMER
800 Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
Facsimile: (208) 562-490 I
Email: dherberholz@ parsonsbehle.com
mhart@parsonsbehle.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Oregon Brewing Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Civil Action No.:

OREGON BREWING COMPANY, an
Oregon corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOUT LLC, dba GONE ROGUE PUB, an
Idaho limited liability company, JASON
GRACIDA, an individual, PHO
XA YAMAHAKHAM, an individual, and
TOM BUTLER, an individual,

COMPLAINT FOR TRADEMARK
COUNTERFEITING, TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT, FALSE
DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARK
CYBERSQUATTING
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

Plaintiff Oregon Brewing Company ("OBC") for this Complaint against Defendants Scout
LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub, Jason Gracida, Pho Xayamahakham, and Tom Butler (hereinafter
"Defendants"), alleges as follows:
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This is an action for trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, false

designation of origin, and unfair competition. OBC owns the well-known mark ROGUE for
restaurants, pubs and alcohol beverages. Since 1989, OBC has continuously used the mark ROGUE
in connection with the advertising, promotion and sale of alcohol beverages, as well as in the name
ofa ROGUE-branded line ofrestaurants and brew pubs. OBC owns incontestable federal trademark
registrations for ROGUE for alcohol beverages, restaurants, and glassware, and has been
manufacturing and selling apparel since 1989. Despite OBC's registrations, Defendants commenced
use of the mark ROGUE in the name of its restaurant and bar.

THE PARTIES
2.

OBC is an Oregon corporation.

3.

Defendant Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub, is an Idaho limited liability company

with its registered agent located at 12547 West Camas Drive, Boise, Idaho 83709 and doing business
as Gone Rogue Pub at 409 South 81h Street, Boise, Idaho 83702.
4.

Defendant Jason Gracida is an individual who, on information and belief, is a co-

owner of Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub and conducts business in the District of Idaho.
5.

Defendant Pho Xayamahakham is an individual who, on information and belief, is a

co-owner of Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub and conducts business in the District of Idaho.
6.

Defendant Tom Butler is an individual who, on information and belief, is a co-owner

of Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub and conducts business in the District of Idaho.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7.

OBC's claims arise under the trademark laws of the United States (Trademark Act of

1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.), and the laws of the State of Idaho. This Court has subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1338, 1367 and 15 U.S.C. § 1121. This Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims arising under the laws of the State of Idaho pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § l 367(a), because those claims are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the
same case or controversy and derive from a common nucleus of operative facts.
Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a

8.

substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims herein transpired in this judicial district.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9.

OBC is among the oldest and most well-established micro-brewers in the United

States. Since 1989, OBC has continuously used the mark ROGUE in commerce in the name of~
ROGUE-branded line ofrestaurants and brew pubs, as well as for alcohol beverages. OBC owns the
following federal trademark registrations for ROGUE:

TRADEMARK

REG.NO.

REG.DATE

GOODS I SERVICES

ROGUE

2669318

12/31 /2002

Beer and ale

ROGUE

3041464

01/10/2006

Restaurant, pub and catering services

ROGUE

3126616

08/08/2006

Beverage glassware

ROGUE

3773029

04/06/2010

Beer

ROGUE

3365653

01 /08/2008

Clothing

I 0.

OBC's federally registered ROGUE marks were applied for and issued prior to

Defendants' conduct giving rise to this action. OBC ' s Registration Nos. 2669318; 3041464;
3126616 and 3773029 for ROGUE have achieved " incontestable" status under the Federal
Trademark Act which means that they are "conclusive evidence" of OBC's "ownership" of these
marks, of the registration of those marks, the "validity" of the marks, and of OBC's "exclusive right"
to use the ROGUE marks in commerce for the goods and services specified in the federal
registrations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ I 065, l l l 5(b).
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11.

OBC's ROGUE mark is inherently distinctive because it does not describe an

attribute of OBC's goods or services.
12.

OBC has invested considerable resources to develop and promote the mark ROGUE.

Forover 15 years, OBC has advertised its ROGUE line ofrestaurants and alcohol beverages over the
internet at rogueales.com and, starting in 1999, at rogue.com. On account of OBC's investment,
and its long and substantial use of the mark ROGUE, that mark has come to be associated
exclusively with goods and services emanating exclusively from OBC. OBC owns common law
marks for ROGUE for alcohol beverages, restaurant and pub services, beverage glassware, and
clothing.

13.

OBC operates 11 restaurants and brew pubs which feature the mark ROGUE. OBC

has been advertising and selling its well-known ROGUE lagers, ales, porters, and stouts i~ Idaho,
including in the Boise, Idaho Metropolitan Area, for over 15 years. OBC has advertised and sold
ROGUE spirits in the Boise, Idaho Metropolitan Area since 2008. OBC's ROGUE mark for its
lagers, ales, porters, stouts and spirits, restaurant and pub services is well-known in the Boise, Idaho
Metropolitan Area and was so long before any of the conduct that forms the basis for this Complaint.
OBC's ROGUE-branded beer and spirits are frequently served in restaurants and bars across the
country and in the Boise, Idaho Metropolitan Area; ROGUE-branded beer is, or has been served, by
defendants at their restaurant and bar ("Gone Rogue Pub").

14.

In October 2012, long after OBC's first use and registration of the mark ROGUE,

Defendants commenced use of the mark ROGUE as the name of their restaurant and bar ("Gone
Rogue

Pub").

In

addition,

Defendants

created

a

Facebook

Page

www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub and began marketing and advertising the ROGUE restaurant
and bar at www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub, including using photographs of people partaking in
alcoholic beverages, using beverage glassware and coasters containing the mark ROGUE, wearing
clothing containing the mark ROGUE, depicting beer taps for various beers on tap at Gone Rogue
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Pub, including at least one of ROGUE ' s beers, issued press releases specifically mentioning that the
bar and restaurant serves ROGUE beers, and displayed ROGUE promotional material inside their
restaurant and pub. A true and correct copy of pages from Defendants' Facebook page is attached as
Exhibit A.
15.

On information and belief, Defendants and Defendants' actual and potential

customers refer to Defendants' restaurant and bar as "Rogue", including on the menu. Defendants
offer micro-brews at their restaurant and bar, including on information and belief, OBC's ROGUE
beer.
16.

In January 2013, OBC owner Brett Joyce called one of Defendants' owners Mr. Jason

Gracida and explained that their conduct infringed OBC's federally registered trademarks. Mr.
Joyce attempted to discuss a reasonable resolution with Mr. Gracida that protected OBC's trademark
rights and avoided litigation. Initially, Mr. Gracida indicated a willingness to work with OBC, but
needed to discuss the matter with the co-owners and his attorney. Mr. Joyce followed up with Mr.
Gracida by email in February 2013, asking that Mr. Gracida call him to discuss the issue. Mr. Joyce
again indicated a willingness to be flexible with defendants and gave Mr. Gracida his personal cell
phone number. Mr. Gracida never responded to Mr. Joyce. Instead, Mr. Joyce received an email
from Mr. Gracida's attorney stating that all further correspondence should be directed to him. A
subsequent telephone message from OBC's general counsel to defendants' attorney was ignored.
17.

Mr. Joyce again reached out to Mr. Gracida in August 2014, again expressing a desire

to resolve this issue without resorting to litigation and was told to discuss the matter with co-owner
Pho Xayamahakham. Mr. Joyce emailed Mr. Xayamahakham in September 2014 "in the hope that
Mr. Xayamahakham would discuss a reasonable resolution of this matter but received no response.
For over a year and a half OBC has attempted to reasonably resolve this issue with defendants in a
manner that avoided litigation but protected its valuable trademark rights. Despite OBC's efforts,
none of defendants' owners or representatives has acknowledged OBC's trademark rights,
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defendants continue to use the ROGUE mark, and have left OBC with no option but to protect its
valuable trademark rights through litigation.
18.

Defendants' conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake and/or deception as to the

affiliation, connection, or association of Defendants with OBC and as to whether OBC approves,
sponsors or endorses Defendants' services.
19.

Defendants conduct constitutes intentional and deliberate trademark counterfeiting

and infringement. Defendants used OBC's ROGUE mark with the intention of trading on the
goodwill and reputation of OBC's mark.
20.

Unless enjoined, Defendants' continued unlawful conduct will irreparably injure

OBC. OBC has no adequate remedy at law.

COUNTI
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
(15 u.s.c. § 1114)
21.

OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs

I through 20 of this Complaint.
22.

OBC owns incontestable federal trademark registrations.for ROGUE for restaurant

and pub services (Reg. No. 3041464), beer and ale (Reg. No. 2669318), beer (Reg. No. 3773029),
and beverage glassware (Reg. No. 3126616).
23.

Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE is likely to cause confusion, mistake, and

deception as to the affiliation, connection, association, origin, sponsorship or approval of
Defendants' services and business activities.
24.

Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE constitutes trademark counterfeiting

because Defendants knowingly used the identical or substantially indistinguishable marks ROGUE,
GONE ROGUE and GONE ROGUE PUB for the services contained in Plaintiff's federal trademark
registration for ROGUE, Reg. No. 3041464, i.e., restaurant services, Reg. No. 2669318 i.e., beer and
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ales, Reg. No. 3773029 i.e., beer, Reg. No. 3126616 i.e., beverage glassware, and clothing, Reg. No.
3365653.
25.

As a direct result of Defendants' intentionally wrongful conduct, Defendants are

causing OBC irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct.
COUNT II
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND FALSE
DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
(15 u.s.c. § 1114)
26.

OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as if fully set forth herein, paragraphs

l through 25 of this Complaint.
27.

OBC owns federal trademark registrations for ROGUE for restaurant and pub

services, alcohol beverages, beverage glassware, and clothing.
28.

Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB,

and www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub constitutes trademark infringement, unfair competition
and false designation of origin because such conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake, and
deception as to the affiliation, connection, association, origin, sponsorship or approval of
Defendants' services and business activities.
29.

As a direct result of Defendants' intentionally wrongful conduct, Defendants are

causing Plaintiff irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct.

COUNTIII
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
FALSE DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
(15 u.s.c. § 1125)
30.

OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs

l through 29 of this Complaint.
31.

OBC owns common law marks for ROGUE for alcohol beverages, restaurant, pub

services, beverage glassware, and clothing.
32.

Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB,

and similar marks, as well as www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub, constitutes trademark
COMPLAINT - 7
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infringement, unfair competition and false designation of origin because such conduct is likely to
cause confusion, mistake, and deception as to the affiliation, connection, association, origin,
sponsorship or approval of Defendants' services and business activities.
33 .

As a direct result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC

irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct.

COUNT IV
CYDER-SQUATTING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1125)
34.

OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs

I through 33 of this Complaint.
Defendants ' creation and use of www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub constitutes

35.

cyber-squatting, because Defendants created and used www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub in an
attempt to profit from OBC's ROGUE marks.
Defendants Facebook page www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub is confusingly

36.

similar to OBC's mark ROGUE and OBC's mark ROGUE was distinctive at the time Defendant
created the Facebook page www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub.
37.

As a direct result of Defendants ' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC

irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct.

COUNTY
UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER IDAHO LAW
(I.C. §§ 48-601 et seq.)
38.

OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs

I through 37 of this Complaint.
39.

Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB

and similar marks, as well as the creation and use of www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub,
constitutes passing off, unfair competition, and false designation of origin in violation of Idaho law
because such conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake, and deception as to the affiliation,
COMPLAINT -
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connection, association, origin, sponsorship or approval of Defendants' services and business
activities.
40.

As a direct result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC

irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct.

COUNT VI
COMMON LAW TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
(I.C. §§ 48-500 et seq.)
41.

OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs

I through 40 of this Complaint.
42.

Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB,

and similar marks, as well as the creation and use of www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub,
constitutes trademark infringement in violation ofldaho law because such conduct is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin of Defendants' services and business
activities.
43.

As a direct result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC

irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, OBC prays that this Court enter judgment against Defendants and:
I.

That this Court grants a permanent injunction:
a.

Enjoining Defendants, their employees, owners, agents, officers, directors,
attorneys, representatives, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and assigns, and
all those in active concert or having knowledge of the causes of action, from
using Plaintiffs ROGUE marks, alone or in combination with any other
word(s), term(s), designation(s), mark(s), and/or design(s), as well as all
similar marks and domain names, including, without limitation, ROGUE,
GONE ROGUE, and GONE ROGUE PUB, as well as the Facebook page

www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub;
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b.

Requiring Defendants to destroy all literature, signs, billboards, labels, prints,
packages, wrappers, containers, advertising materials, stationery, menus,
beverage glassware and other items in their possession, custody or control
that use ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, and GONE ROGUE PUB, as well as the
Facebook page www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub;

c.

Requiring Defendants to discontinue all use of the Facebook page

www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub; and
d.

Requiring Defendants to file with the Court and serve on Plaintiff, within
thirty (30) days after entry of an injunction, a report in writing under oath
setting forth in detail the manner in which Defendants have complied with
the Court's injunction.

2.

That this Court grants relief in the form of reasonable costs and attorney fees to
OBC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c), and the laws of the State of
Idaho including, but not limited to, I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121, 12-123, and 48-514.

3.

That this Court award treble damages to OBC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and I.C.
§ 48-514.

4.

That this Court grant OBC such other and further injunctive relief as it should
deem just and proper.

DATED THIS 14th day of October, 2014.
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER

By Isl Dana M Herberholz
Dana M. Herberholz
Maria O. Hart
Attorneys for Plaintiff Oregon Brewing Company
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 38.

DA TED THIS 14th day of October, 2014.
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER

By Isl Dana M Herberholz
Dana M. Herberholz
Maria O. Hart
Attorneys for Plaintiff Oregon Brewing Company
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Common Policy
Declarations

TRUCK , INSURANCE
(A RECIPROCAL

EXCHANGE
COMPANY)

Members Of The Farmers Insurance Group Of Co1111anies
Home Office: 4680 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California 900 I0
RESTAURANTS

-PREMIER

l.
Named
XAYAMAHAICHAM,
PHO
Insured·
SEE E0002
Mailing· 409 S 8TH STREET #103
Address·

Acct. No.
75-35-342

60541-78-07

Agent No.

ID 83702

BOISE

Prod. Count
Policy Number

The named insured is an individual unless otherwise stated:

0

Partnership

D Corporation

OJoint Venture O Organization (Any other)

Type of Business _R_E_S_T_A_U_RANT
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
2. Policy Period from 11/07 /12

(not prior to time applied for) to 11/07 /13

12:01 a.m. Standard Time

If this policy replaces other coverage that ends at noon standard time of the same d~y this policy begins, this policy will
not take effect until the other coverage ends. This policy will continue for successive policy periods as follows: If we elect
to continue this insurance, we will renew this polic-y if you pay the required renewal premium for e-.ach successive policy
('<'riod subject to our premiums, rules and forms then in effect.

TI1is Policy Consists Of The Following Coverage Parts Listed Below And For Which A Premium Is Indic.ated. This
Premium May Be Subject To Change.
p rem mm After A.pp rtea bl C
BUSINESSOWNERS
EMPLOYMENT
CERTIFIED

POLICY

PRACTICES
ACTS

o·1scounl a.Illi 1Mod'f
1 1cat1on
$1,933.00

INSURANCE

OF TERRORISM

-

COVERAGE
SEE DISCLOSURE

INCLUDED
ENDORSEME~T

Total *see Additional Fee Information below

INCLUDED

See Invoice Attached

~
Sf>.S990 4TH EDITION 4-11
S6S990-ED4
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BUSINESSOWNERS
BP 00 06 01 97

BUSINESSOWNERS LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM

Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage.
Read the entire policy carefully to determine rights,
duties and what is and is not covered .
Throughout this policy the words "you" and "your"
refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations. The words "we","us" and "our" refer to the
Company providing this insurance.
The word "insured" means any person or organization qualifying as such under Section C - Who Is An
Insured.
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation
marks have special meaning. Refer to Section F Liabili1y And Medical Expenses Definitions.

A. Coverages
1. Business Liability
a. We will pay 1hose sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injur:y", "property
damage", "personal injury" or "advertising
injury" to which this insurance applies.
We will have the right and duty to defend
the insured against any "suit" seeking
those damages. However, we will have no
duty to defend the insured against any
"suit" seeking damages for "bodily injury",
"property damage", "personal injury", or
"advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply. We may at our discretion, investigate any "occurrence" and
settle any claim or "suit" that may result.
But:
(1) The amount we will pay for damages
is limited as described in Section D Liability And Medical Expenses Limits
Of Insurance; and
(2) Our right and duty to defend end when
we have used up the applicable limit
of insurance in the payment of judgments or settlements or medical expenses.
No other obligation or liability to pay sums
or perform acts or services is covered
unless explicitly provided for under Coverage Extension .- Supplementary Payments .

BP 00 06 01 97

b. This insurance applies:
(1) To " bodily injury" and "property dam-

age" only if:
(a) The

"bodily injury" or "property
damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that takes place in the "coverage territory": and
(b) The "bodily injury" or "property
damage" occurs during the policy
period .
(2) To:

(a) "Personal injury" caused by an offense arising out of your business,
excluding advertising, publishing ,
broadcasting or telecasting done by
or for you;
(b) "Advertising injury" caused b~ an
offense committed in the course of
advertising your goods, products or
services;

but only if the offense was committed
in the "coverage territory" during the
policy period.
c. Damages because of "bodily injury" in-

clude damages claimed by any person or
organization for care, loss of services or
death resulting at any time from the "bodily injury" .

d. Coverage Extension - Supplementary Payments

In addition to the Limit of Insurance we
will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit" against
an insured we defend :
(1) All expenses we incur.
(2) Up to $250 for cost of bail bonds required because of accidents or traffic
law violations arising out of the use of
any vehicle to which Business Liability
Coverage for "bodily injury" applies.
We do not have to furnish these bonds.

(3) The cost of bonds to release attachments, but only for bond amounts
within our Limit of Insurance. We do
not have to furnish these bonds.

Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997
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2. Medical Expenses

a. We will pay medical expenses as described below for "bodily injury" caused
by an accident:
(1) On premises you own or rent;

(2) On ways next to premises you own or
rent; or
(3) Because of your operations;
provided that:
(a) The accident takes place in the
"coverage territory" and during the
policy period;
(b) The expenses are incurred and reported to us within one year of the
date of the accident; and
(c) The injured person submits to examination, at our expense, by physicians of our choice as often as we
reasonably require.
b. We will make these payments regardless
of fault. These payments will not exceed
the Limit of Insurance. We will pay reasonable expenses for:
(1) First aid administered at the time of an
accident;
(2) Necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and
dental services, including prosthetic
devices; and
(3) Necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services .
B. Exclusions

1. Applicable To Business Liability Coverage
This insurance does not apply to:
a. Expected Or Intended Injury

"Bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or intended from the standpoint of
the insured. This exclusion does not apply
to "bodily injury" resulting from the use of
reasonable force to protect persons or
property.
b. Contractual Liability

"Bodily injury" or "property damage" for
which the insured is obligated to pay
damages by reason of the assumption of
liability in a contract or agreement. This
exclusion does not apply to liability for
damages:

BP 00 06 01 97

(1) That the insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement; or

(2) Assumed in a contract or agreement
that is an "insured contract", provided
the "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs subsequent to the execution of the contract or agreement.
Solely for the purposes of liability assumed in an "insured contract", reasonable attorney fees and necessary
litigation expenses incurred by or for
a party other than an insured are
deemed to be damages because of
"bodily injury" or "property damage",
provided:
(a) Liability to such party for, or for the
cost of, that party's defense has
also been assumed in the same
"insured contract"; and
(b) Such attorney fees and litigation
expenses are for defense of that
party against a civil or alternative
dispute resolution proceeding in
which damages to which this insurance applies are alleged.
c. Liquor Liability
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" for
which any insured may be held liable by
reason of:
(1) Causing
or contributing
to the
intoxication of any person;
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages
to a person under the legal drinking
age or under the influence of alcohol;
or
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation
relating to the sale, gift, distribution or
use of alcoholic beverages.
This exclusion applies only if you are in
the business of manufacturing, distributing, selling, serving or furnishing alcoholic
beverages.
d. Workers' Compensation And Similar Laws
Any obligation of the insured under a
workers' compensation, disability benefits
or unemployment compensation law or
any similar law.

Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997
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(8) Body piercing services; and
(9) Services in the practice of pharmacy;
but this exclusion does not apply to an
insured whose operations include
those of a retail druggist or drugstore.

"Property damage" to "impaired property"
or property that has not been physically
injured, arising out of:

(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or
dangerous condition in "your product"
or "your work"; or

k. Damage To Property

"Property damage" to:
(1) Property you own, rent or occupy;

(2) Premises you sell, give away or abandon, if the "property damage" arises
out of any part of those premises;
(3) Property loaned to you;
(4) Personal property in the care, custody
or control of the insured;
(5) That particular part of real property on
which you or any contractor or subcontractor working directly or indirectly
on your behalf is performing operations, if the "property damage" arises
out of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that
must be restored, repaired or replaced
because "your work" was incorrectly
performed on it.
Paragraph (2) of this exclusion does not
apply if the premises are "your work" and
were never occupied, rented or held for
rental by you.
Paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6) of this exclusion do not apply to liability assumed
under a sidetrack agreement.
Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not
apply to "property damage" included in
the "products - completed operations
hazard".

I. Damage To Your Product
"Property damage" to "your product" arising out of it or any part of it.

m. Damage To Your Work
"Property damage" to "your work" arising
out of it or any part of it and included in
the "products - completed operations
hazard".
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the
damage arises was performed on your
behalf by a subcontractor.

Page 6 of 15

n. Damage To Impaired Property Or Property
Not Physically Injured

(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone
acting on your behalf to perform a
contract or agreement in accordance
with its terms.
This exclusion does not apply to the loss
of use of other property arising out of
sudden and accidental physical injury to
"your product" or "your work" after it has
been put to its intended use.
o. Recall Of Products, Work Or Impaired
Property

Damages claimed for any loss, cost or
expense incurred by you or others for the
loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection,
repair, replacement, adjustment, removal
or disposal of:
(1) "Your product";

(2) "Your work"; or
(3) "Impaired property";
if such product, work or property is withdrawn or recalled from the market or from
use by any person or organization because of a known or suspected defect,
deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.
p. Personal Or Advertising Injury

"Personal injury" or "advertising injury":
(1) Arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge
of its falsity;

(2) Arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first publication
took place before the beginning of the
policy period;

Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997
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b. If a claim is made or "suit" is brought
against any insured, you must:

4. Legal Action Against Us

No person or organization has a right under
this policy:

(1) Immediately record the specifics of the

claim or "suit" and the date received;
and
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable.

a. To join us as a party or otherwise bring

You must see to it that we receive written
notice of the claim or "suit" as soon as
practicable.

b. To sue us on this policy unless all of its
terms have been fully complied with .

c. You and any other involved insured must:
(1) Immediately send us copies of any de-

mands, notices, summonses or legal
papers received in connection with the
claim or "suit";
(2) Authorize us to obtain records and
other information;
(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation,
or settlement of the claim or defense
against the "suit" ; and

us into a "suit" asking for damages from
an insured; or

A person or organization may sue us to recover on an agreed settlement or on a final
judgment against an insured obtained after
an actual trial; but we will not be liable for
damages that are not payable under the
terms of this policy or that are in excess of
the applicable limit of insurance. An agreed
settlement means a settlement and release
of liability signed by us, the insured and the
claimant or the claimant's legal representative.
5. Separation Of Insureds

(4) Assist us, upon our request, in the
enforcement of any right against any
person or organization that may be liable to the insured because of injury
or damage to which this insurance may
also apply.
d. No insured will, except at that insured's
own cost, voluntarily make a payment,
assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our
consent.

Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance ,
and any rights or duties specifically assigned
in this policy to the first Named Insured, this
insurance applies:

a. As if each Named Insured were the only
Named Insured; and
b. Separately to each insured against whom
claim is made or "suit'' is brought.
F. Liability And Medical Expenses Definitions

1. "Advertising injury" means injury arising out
of one or more of the following offenses:

3. Financial Responsibility Laws

a. When this policy is certified as proof of fi-

a. Oral or written publication of material that

nancial responsibility for the future under
the provisions of any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, the insurance provided by the policy for "bodily injury"
liability and "property damage" liability
will comply with the provisions of the law
to the extent of the coverage and limits of
insurance required by that law.

slanders or libels a person or organization
or disparages a person's or organization's
goods, products or services;

b. With respect to "mobile equipment" to
which this insurance applies, we will provide any liability, uninsured motorists,
underinsured motorists, no-fault or other
coverage required by any motor vehicle
law. We will provide the required limits for
those coverages.

BP 00 06 01 97

b. Oral or written publication of material that
violates a person's right of privacy;
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business; or

d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.

Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997
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JUL 1 3 2017
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Ot;'iJ!~~@f'R!CH, Clerk
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Sy EMILY CHILO
o~-v

SCOUT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, doing business as Double Tap Pub,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVO 1-16-17560

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

FARMERS GROUP, INC., a California
corporation; and TRUCK INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, an inter-insurance exchange
organized under the laws of the state of
California,
Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a dispute over whether Defendant, Truck Insurance Exchange (..Truck") breached
its duty to defend its alleged insured, Scout LLC d/bla. Gone Rogue Pub, ("Scout") in a
trademark infringement action brought over Scout's use of trademark "ROGUE" in the operation
and advertisement of its restaurant/pub, Gone Rogue Pub .. In this action, Scout brought claims
against Truck for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and insurance bad faith. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the claims.
Oral argument was held on the motions on May 30, 2017, after which the Court took the
matter under advisement.
II.

STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if the movant shows, based on cited

materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. IRCP 56(a), (c). The burden of proving the absence of a
material fact rests at all times upon the moving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769-70,
820 P.2d 360, 364-65 ( 1991 ). If the moving party challenges an element of the nonrnoving
party's case on the.basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact.
Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). To this
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end, the nonmoving party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. A party against whom a motion for
summary judgment is sought ..may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings," but
must establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact by citing to ponions of the record or
through affidavits setting forth facts that arc admissible as evidence. Id.; IRCP 56(c).
The standards for summary judgment further require the district court to liberally construe
the facts in favor of the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record ·
in favor of the non-moving party. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at 364. This means that all
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied if the
evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people
might reach different conclusions. Id.
Ill.

FACTS

Scout was registered as an Idaho limited liability company on or around November 30,
2011. Deel. Xayamahakham, 1 2. On or around October I, 2012, Scout purchased the assets of
8th Street Bistro, LLC, which included a restaurant and bar operating as "Casa Del Sol" located
in downtown Boise, Idaho ("Premises"). Id. at ii,i 5- l 0. Shortly thereafter, the members of Scout
decided to rebrand the restaurant and bar and operate under the name "Gone Rogue Pub." Id. at

ffll 11-13. On or around October 11, 2012, Scout posted to Facebook a picture of a "Gone Rogue
Pub" logo that Scout was thinking about using. Id. at ffll 28-29, Exh. 7 ("October Post"). The text
accompanying the logo post stated, "Here is our new logo! Signs are going up today and
tomorrow! Hope everyone likes it! Let us know what you guys think!" Id. According to Pho,
Scout posted the logo because it was "thinking about using" it and wanted to get feedback from
followers. Deel. Xayamahakham, ,i 28.
Thereafter, on or around October 16, 2012, Scout registered "Gone Rogue Pub" as an
assumed business name for Scout with the Idaho Secretary of State. Id. at ~ 13-14, Exh. 4.
Scout did not post any other pictures of the logo or otherwise advertise the name "Gone Rogue
Pub" on its Fa~cbook page or through any other media until November 7, 2012. Id. at ffll 28-32.
Prior to opening for business on or about October 23, 2012, Pho Xayamahakham ("Pho"),
on behalf of Scout, contacted Theresa Vinccnt-Leitennan, an agent for Truck Insurance
Exchange ("Truck"), to request a commercial business insurance policy for Scout. Id. at ffll 1618. Pho informed Ms. Vincent-Leiterman that Scout would be operating a restaurant and pub
2

APPENDIXC

000596

under the assumed business name "Gone Rogue Pub", filled out an information sheet for Scout.

Id. at ,MJ 16-22. Between October 23, 2012 and November 7, 2012, at the request of Ms. VincentLeitennan and assumedly in order to obtain the Policy, Pho provided Ms. Vincent-Leitennan,
multiple documents including copies of Scout's Certificate of Organization, the Gone Rogue
Certificate of Assumed Business Name, the Lease Agreement between Foster Family Limited
Partnership, Melinda L. Foster, General Partner and Scout LLC ("Scout Lease"), and the
occupancy permits and licenses issued to Scout, dba as Gone Rogue Pub, by the City of Boise
and Ada County. Id. at ,Mi t 6- t 8, Exh.4-6. After providing the requisite business records and
completing the required inspections of the Premises, Truck issued a business liability insurance
policy ("Policy"), with an effective coverage date beginning November 7, 2012. 1 Aff. Thomson,
Exh. B (Policy). Scout paid all premiums due under the Policy. Deel. Xayamahakham, ,i 22.
The first section of the Policy identifies Pho, his wife, Sakpraseuth Outhinh, and "Gone
Rogue" as the named insureds, lists the Prenuses as the insureds' address, identifies the type of
business insured as a "Restaurant," and describes the Policy Coverage as a "Businessowners Policy"
and "Employment Practices Insurance Coverage." Policy, pp. 23, 27. While Pho did not personally
complete the insurance application or.draft the language of the Policy, he was assured at all time
by Ms. Vincent-Lcitennan that the Policy would and did provide the requested coverage for
Scout as it did business as Gone Rogue Pub. Deel. Xayamahakham, 111 16-27.
Scout obtained the necessary alcohol licenses and pennits from the Boise City and
Ada County on or around November 15, 2012. Id. at ,Mi 33-34, Exh. 9. Scout hung its outdoor
signage on November 19, 2012, obtained merchandise and glassware bearing the logo "Gone
Rogue Pub" on November 20, 2012, and opened for.business on or about November 21, 2012.

Id. at fl 35-40 and Exhs. 10, 11.
Two years later, on October 14, 2014, Scout, dba Gone Rogue Pub, was sued by Oregon
Brewing Company ("OBC"). Aff. Thomas, Exh. A, p. 3 (OBC Complaint). The OBC Complaint
alleged that OBC had continuously used the mark "ROGUE" in commerce in the name of a
ROGUE-branded line of restaurants and brew pubs, as well as for alcoholic beverages, and that
OBC owed five federal trademark registrations for "Beer and Ale"; "Restaurant, pub and
catering services"; "Beverage glassware"; "Beer"; and "Clothing." OBC alleged that it had been
1 The Policy wai1 applied for on October 23, 2012 but did not become ctTec1ive unlil November 7, 2012. Thomson

Aff. , Ex. A. The Policy was automatically renewed on November 7, 2013.

3
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advertising and selling its well-known ROGUE lagers, ales, porters and stouts in Idaho for over
fifteen years. OBC asserted that "(i]n October of 2012, long after OBC's first use apd
registration of the mark ROGUE, Defendants commenced use of the mark ROGUE as the name
of their restaurant and bar ('Gone Rogue Pub')." Id. at ,i 14. Attached as exhibits to the OBC
Complaint were various examples of Scout's use of the ROGUE mark, including a screen shot of
the October Post. Id. at Exh A, p. 73. OBC asserted various claims against Scout for its violation
of OBC's five different trademark rcgistrations 2 and sought injunctive relief, attorney fees and
costs, and treble damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and I.C. § 48-514. Id., p. 10.
The Policy provides coverage for "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of ... 'advertising injury' ... caused by an offense committed in the
course of advertising your goods, product or services; but only if the offense was committed in
the 'coverage territory' during the policy period." Policy, § A( 1)b(2)(b). An ''advertising injury"
is defined as, inter alia, "[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" or
"infringement of copyright, title or slogan." Id. at§ F(l )(c), (d). Excluded from coverage under
the Policy is "advertising injury" "arising out of oral or written publication of material whose
first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period[.]" ("Prior Publication
exclusion") Id. at § 8( I )(p)(2).
On December 3, 2014, Scout's counsel sent a letter to Truck informing it of the OBC
lawsuit and requesting coordination for representation of Scout and Pho. Deel. Tipton, Exh. A.
On December 23, 2014, Truck responded, indicating there was a ''possibility" the claim was not
covered and requested a conference with Plaintiff's counsel about its investigation. Id. at Exh. B.
A conference was held between Plaintitrs counsel and Truck's claims examiner and, on January
9, 2015, Plaintiffs counsel sent a follow-up letter to Truck which explained that a factual
allegation in the OBC Complaint- namely, that the violation began in October of 2012- was
incorrect because Gone Rogue Pub did not open for business until commence operations until
after the Policy took effect. Id. at Exh. C. Enclosed with the letter were documents evidencing
that Gone Rogue Pub did not receive its alcohol permits until November 14, 2012. /d.

2

Specifically, the OBC Complaint alleged Trademark Counterfeiting Under Tbe Lanham Act (IS U.S.C. § 1114);
Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition and False Designation of Origin Under The Lanham Act (IS U.S.C. §
1114); Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition and False Designation of Origin Under The Lanham Act (1 S
U.S.C. § 1125); Cyber-squatting Under The Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § I 12S): Unfair Business Practices Under Idaho
law (I.C. § 48-601 et seq.); and Common Law Trademark Infringement (I.C. § 48-SOO et lleq.).

4
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On January 16, 2015, Truck sent a letter denying coverage and a defense for the OBC
Lawsuit based on the fact that: ( 1) Scout was not a named insured under the Policy; (2) the
"advertising injury" arose out of publications that were first published in October of 2012 and,
therefore, was excluded by the Prior Publication exclusion, and; (3) the Policy did not cover the
damages sought in the OBC Complaint. Id. at Exh. D.
On March 26, 2015, Scout entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release
("Settlement") with OBC to settle the OBC lawsuit. Id., Ex. J. As part of the Settlement, Scout
agreed to abandon its use of the word "Rogue" and in August of2015 changed is business name
from "Gone Rogue Pub" to "Double Tap Pub." Id. On September 20, 2016, Scout filed the
instant action.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Truck cites three separate bases for judgment in its favor: I) only Gone Rogue Pub-not
Scout- w.as a named insured and, therefore, Truck had no duty to defend the infringement suit
against Scout; 2) coverage for the "advertising injury" was excluded under the Prior Publication
exclusion, and; 3) the Policy does not provide coverage for the damages sought by OBC.
Scout, in tum, argues that: I) because Gone Rogue Pub is a named insured under the
policy and Scout is the legal entity doing business as Gone Rogue Pub, Scout is necessarily
insured as well; 2) the Prior Publication exclusion does not apply, and; 3) whether or not
damages in the lawsuit would ultimately be Truck's responsibility does not affect its duty to
defend.

A.

Scout Is a Named Insured.

The determination of whether Scout is insured under the Policy requires ascertaining the
distinction, if any, between a business and its trade name. At the time the Policy was issued,
assumed business names were governed by The Assumed Business Names Act of 1997, Idaho
Code§§ 53-501 ct. seq. 3 Pursuant to I.C. 53-503(1 )(a), an "assumed business name" was
defined as "(a]ny name other than the true name of any formally organized or registered entity,
under which name the entity holds itself out for the transaction of business in the state of
Idaho[.]" Importantly, because an assumed business name is nothing more than another name for
a recognized legal entity, the filing of a certificate of assumed busin~s name does not create a

' Idaho Code§§ 53-501 was replaced in 2015 with the comparable provisions ofl.C. § 30-21-801. et. seq.
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separate legal entity. Salazar v. Tilley. 110 Idaho 584, 716 P.2d 1356, 1357 n. 1 (Ct.App.1986);
O'Banion v. Select Portfolio Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 5572625, at •9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2011 ).

Idaho law, like the majority of states, recognizes that, ''in the absence of statutory
prohibition, a corporation may conduct business and enter into a valid contract under an assumed
name." W.l. Scott. Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, /nc~, 103 Idaho 736,739,653 P.2d 791, 794 (1982).
This includes insurance c~ntracts. 3 Couch on Ins.§ 40:4 (3rd ed., updated Dec. 2016)(..An
individual may contract for insurance using a trade name."). Because a trade name is not a legal
entity, many courts have determined that, in such cases, the legal entity behind the trade name is
the insured under policies listing the insured by a trade name. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Outdoor
Concepts, 661 N.W.2d 441,444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)(collecting cases).

For example, in O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., the plaintiff sought
uninsured motorist coverage under his policy after his son suffered serious injuries. The policy
agreed to cover "the Named Insured ... and, while residents of the same household,
the ... relatives of[the Named lnsured]." 639 F.2d 1019, 1026 (3d Cir.1981). The policy
designated the named insured as ..Coe Management Company," the trade name under which
plaintiff operated his business. Id. at 1021. In conducting its analysis, the Third Circuit stated
that "an insured's trade name and given name should be equated'' and that "where an insured
purchases a policy in a trade name, the policy will be viewed as if issued in his given name." Id.
at 1025.4
Here, the Declarations Page lists the Named Insured as Pho-an individual-and
identifies the type of business being insured as a "restaurant." Through an endorsement, Pho's
wife and "Gone Rogue" were added as Named Insureds. While "Gone Rogue" is not specifically
identified as an assumed business name, it is not identified as an independent legal entity either.
Rather, the evidence establishes that the legal entity behind the "Gone Rogue" trade name has
4

See also, Simmons,.. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 17 P.3d 56, 62 (Alaska 2001) (when a business owner acquirel4 insurance
in his trade name, coverage ell tends to the owner a.-i well a.'I the business); Chmiell!wski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
591 A.2d 10 I. 113 {Conn. 1991) (stating that "one who operates a business under a trade name is nonetheless an
individual insured under a policy issued in that trade name".); Purcell,•. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 S.E.2d 530, 531 - 533
(Ga. App. 1983) (businel!S auto liability policy naming "Purcell Radiator Serv." as the insured applied to individual
operating under that trade name and, by extension, to his family member injured by an unin!lured motorist); Sterling
,.. Ohio Cas. Ins. C"·· 936 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that when insurance is iSllued to a
pannership or in the trade name of the owner of a business, coverage usually extends to the family members of the
panncr.i or owner); P<11revito 1•. Country Mut. Ins. Co. 118 Ill.App. 3rd 573, 74 Ill.Dec. 259, 455 N.E.2d 289 (3d
Dist.1983) {concluding an insurance policy is.'lued to "Patrevito's Florist & Greenhouse," an unincorporated
bu.~incss, covered its owner.)
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always been Scout and, therefore, Scout must be considered the "Named Insured." To find
otherwise would be illogical. Because "Gone Rogue" has no legal existence complete in itself,
there is no need for it to be independently insured. Further, it has no ability to enter into an
insurance contrc1ct in the first place. Its designation as a Named Insured becomes meaningful
only in reference to the entity actually operating it, which is Scout. Therefore, Truck's argument
that "Gone Rogue" is a Named Insured but Scout is not is not a reasonable interpretation of the
Policy. Consequently, the Policy is not ambiguous and this Court finds as a matter oflaw that
Scout is a Named Insured. 5
8.

The OBC Complaint Did Not Trigger a Duty to Defend

Truck's second argument in support of summary judgment is that, even if Scout were a
Named Insured, the allegations within the four comers of the OBC Complaint did not give rise to
a duty to defend. Namely, since the OBC Complaint alleged that t~e first publication of"Gone
Rogue Pub" occurred in October of 2012-prior to the effective date of the Policy-and
provided evidence of the publication through an exhibit to the OBC Complaint, Truck argues it
properly declined the defense pursuant to the Prior Publication exclusion.
Scout disputes that Truck can avoid its duty to defend by relying solely on the allegations
in the OBC Complaint. Rather, Scout asserts that Truck must also consider known extrinsic facts
outside the OBC Complaint in determining whether it has a duty to defend. Namely, Scout
arbrues that Truck's duty to defend consideration should have accounted for the information later
conveyed by Scout's counsel to Truck's claim representative that Gone Rogue Pub was not even
operating until the latter part of November of 2012-after coverage became effective-and,
therefore, the October 2012 post was not an injurious publication within the scope of the Prior
Publication exclusion.

5

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Policy were ambiguous as to the identities of the Named Insureds, ambiguities
are to be construed most strongly against the in,;un:d. Armstrong v. Farmer.~ Ins. Co. of Idaho. 14 7 Idaho 67. 69- 70,
205 P.3d 1203, 1205 06 (2009). Therefore, the Court would reach the same conclusion that Scout is a Named
ln!,ured. Additionally. where an insurer- through iL,; agent- knows the true name of the insured but issues a policy
in a trade name or assumed name, the insurer will not be permitted to deny liability on the basis of that designation.
3 Couch on Ins.§ 40:4 (3nt ed., updated Dec. 2016). The undisputed facts establish that Pho infonned Truck's agent
Iha& Scout was going to operate a restaurant and bar under the assumed business name of"Gone Rogue Pub" and
provided her wilh Scout's certificate of organization, lhe Gone Rogue ABN, the lca!IC agreement for the Gone
Rogue Pub space, which wa.,i executed by Scout, and the alcohol license issued to Scout dba Gone Rogue Pub. Deel.
Pho, ,i 23 and Exhs. l. 4, Sand 9. Thus. Truck cannot deny liability on the basis that Scout was not listed as a

Named Insured.
7
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These arguments raise two issues: I) whether Truck was required to look to facts beyond
the allegations in the OBC Complaint in determining its duty to defend, and; 2) the application of
the Prior Publication exclusion.
I.

A Duty to Defend is Defined by Allegations of the Underlying Complaint.

Idaho has long held that the duty to defend "arises upon the filing of a complaint whose
allegations, in whole or in part, read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be
covered by the insured's policy." County of Boise v. Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Program,
Underwriters, l SI Idaho 90 I, 904, 265 P.3d 514, 517 (2011 ); Kootenai County v. W Cas. and
Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910-11, 750 P.2d 87, 89-90 (1988). The duty to defend arises only

where an insurance policy provides that the insurer has a duty to defend against the specific type
of claim alleged. Dave's, Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho 744, 748, 291 P.3d 427, 431 (2012). Stated
another way, ''[f]or there to be a duty to defend, the complaint's allegations, in whole or in part,
when read broadly, must allege a claim to which the duty to defend applies under the terms of
the insurance policy." Id. "If the complaint discloses no possibility of coverage, the insurer may
properly decline to defend against it." County of Boise, supra. However, if there is doubt as to
whether a theory of recovery pied within the complaint is covered under the policy, the insurer
must defend regardless of potential defenses arising under the policy. Kootenai County, supra.
Where an insurance policy clearly excludes certain types of claims from coverage, a duty
to defend those claims does not arise. Dave ·s. Inc., 153 Idaho at 749-50, 291 P.3d at 432- 33
(finding no duty to defend a contractor's action against homeowner brought as a breach of
contract claim under a "because of ... property damage" provision "to which this coverage
applies" because the policy excluded property damage to the home); County of Boise, 151 Idaho
at 905, 265 P.3d at 517 (finding no duty to defend where lawsuit arose out of or was connected
with land use regulation or planning and zoning activities which were specifically excluded
under policy). 6

6

Scout argues that any time an insurer believes coverage is excluded under the policy by a policy exclusion, the
insurer must undenake the defense and then tile a declaratory judgment action to establish the application of the
exclusion. However, the Idaho Supreme Coun has unequivocally stated that ''the insurer may not be requiJ"e4 to
defend if it can establish that the exclusion contained in the policy is clear and unambiguous." Con.fir. Mgmt. SyJ .•
Inc. l '. As.vurance Co. ofAm., 13S Idaho 680,684, 23 P.3d 142, 146 (2001).
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However, where a claim presents a fact pattern arguably within the policy, and the
application of an exclusion presents a fairly debatable question of law or fact, the insurer has a
duty to defend its insured until that question is resolved. Black v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co.,
115 Idaho 449,457, 767 P.2d 824, 832 (Ct. App. t 989) ...The proper procedure for the insurer to
take is to evaluate the claims and determine whether an arguable potential exists for a claim
covered by the policy; if so, then the insurer must immediately step in and defend the suit. At the
same time, if the insurer believes that the policy itself provides a basis for noncovcrage through
an exclusion, it may seek declaratory relief." Deluna v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 149 Idaho
81, 85, 233 P.3d 12, 16 (2008), quoting Kootenai County, 113 Idaho at 911, 750 P.2d at 90.
In recent years, the Court has uniformly held that "[a]n insurer does not have to look
beyond the words of the complaint to determine if a possibility of coverage exists." Hoyle v.

Utica Mm. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 373, 48 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2002), citing Construction
Management v. Assurance Company ofAmerica. 135 Idaho 680, 23 P.3d 142 (2001). In Hoyle,
the insured argued that because the facts behind the underlying complaint potentially gave rise to
an action for negligence-which would be covered by the policy- the insurer had a duty to
defend. The Court rejected the argument, holding that: I) the complaint made no express claim
for negligence, and 2) even if facts behind the underlying complaint ''might disclose negligent
acts, it is irrelevant" since an insurer need not look beyond the words of the underlying
complaint. Id.; see also AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Im•. Co .. 140 Idaho 733, 738, 101 P.3d 226,
231 (2004)(holding that even if facts behind a complaint may give rise to covered claims, the
facts are irrelevant to insurer's duty to defend.) ·
Relying on earlier Idaho precedent, Scout argues that an insurer must also consider facts
outside the underlying complaint in determining whether it has a duty to defend. To this end,
Scout relies primarily on Pendlebury v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456,464,406 P.2d 129,
134 ( 1965) and State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co .. 647 F. Supp. 1064, I 068 (D. Idaho t 986).
However, these cases are factually distinguishable. Both pertain to situations where the
complaint initially states a claim against the insured which is potentially covered- thereby
triggering the duty to defend- but then later-developed facts reveal that the claim falls outside of
covt..-rage, which would then allow the insun.-r to revoke the duty to defend through a separate

9
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declaratory judgment proceeding. In other words, facts beyond the underlying complaint are
pertinent to the continuing duty to defend, but not to the initial duty to defend. 7
On the initial duty to defend-which is at issue here-the more recent case law cited
herein unequivocally holds that the duty is solely dependent on the broadly construed allegations
of the underlying complaint. Thus, following this precedent, the Court will ascertain whether
Truck's duty to defend was triggered based on the allegations of the OBC Complaint.
2.

The Prior Publication Exclusion Unambiguously Excludes Coverage.

The OBC Complaint asserts that Scout's use of the mark "ROGUE" violated OBC's five
different trademark registrations of the mark for: "Beer and Ale"; "Restaurant, pub and catering
services"; "Beverage glassware"; "Beer"; and "Clothing." OBC Cmplt., ,i 9. Notably, the OBC
Complaint alleges that "In October 2012, long after OBC's first use and registration of the mark
ROGUE, Defendants commenced use of the mark ROGUE as the name of their restaurant and
bar ('Gone Rogue Pub')." Id., ,i 14. Attached to the OBC Complaint as an exhibit is the October
Post.
The Policy provides coverage for ''those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of ... 'advertising injury' ... caused by an offense committed in the
course of advertising your goods, product or services; but only if the offense was committed in
the 'coverage territory' during the policy period." Policy, § A(l )b(2)(b). An "advertising injury"
is defined as, inter a/ia, "[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" or .
"infringement of copyright, title or slogan." Id. at § f( I)(c), (d). The Prior Publication exclusion
excludes "advertising injury" "arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first
publication took place before the beginning of the policy period[.]" Id. at § B( I)(p)(2).
The parties do not dispute that Scout's use of the "ROGUE" mark constitutes an
"advertising injury" which would otherwise be covered under the Policy. However, the issue is
whether the allegations of the OBC Complaint, when read broadly, trigger the Prior Publication
exclusion. To this end, Truck bears the burden of establishing that the Prior Publication
exclusion clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage. Construction Management, 135 Idaho
at 684, 23 P.3d at 146. Stated another way, Truck must establish that the exclusion, as applied to
7

Indeed. in Kootenai County, the Idaho Supreme Court cited approvingly to Bunker Hill, pointing out if it is
"foreseeable" to the insurer that the claim against the insured could be covered, the inllurer ha.<1 a duty to defend
unless and until the "unfolding of litigation" reveals facts which place the claim outside coverage. 113 Idaho at 911,

750 P.2d at 90.
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the allegations in the OBC Complaint, does not present a "fairly debatable question of law or
fact." Black, 115 Idaho at 457, 767 P.2d at 832.

a.

The Prior Publication exclusion is unambiguous.

Insurance policies are a contract between the insurer and the insured. Mortensen v.

Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,442,235 P.3d 387,392 (2010), citing Hall v. Farmers
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 318, 179 P.3d 276, 280 (2008). When interpreting
insurance policies, a court is to apply the general rules of contract law subject to certain special
canons of construction. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69-70, 205 P.3d
1203, 1205- 06 (2009), quoting Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,461, 180
P.3d 498,500 (2008). Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law. Id.,
quoting Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co .. 142 Idaho 2 I3, 216, 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005).
Where policy lan~'Uage is found to be unambiguous, a court is to construe the policy as
written, ..and the Court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor
make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to
the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability." Id., quoting Pun•is, supra . ..Unless
contrary intent is shown, common, non-technical words are given the meaning applied by
laymen in daily usage-as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage-in order to
. effectuate the intent of the parties." Id., quoting Howard v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214,
2 I 7, 46 P.3d 510, 513 (2002). In deciding whether a particular provision is ambiguous, the
provision must be read within the context in which it occurs in the policy. Id., citing Purvis,

supra. An insurance policy provision is ambiguous if "it is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretations." N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 253, 939 P.2d 570, 572 ( 1997). Words
in an insurance policy that have a settled legal meaning are not ambiguous merely because the
policy docs not contain a definition. Id.
Because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts that are not typically subject to
negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the contract is construed most
strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 70,205 P.3d at
1206, citing Arreguin 145 Idaho at 461, 180 P.3d at 500 (..A provision that seeks to exclude the
insurer's coverage must be strictly construed in favor of the insured."). Further, insurance
contracts are to be construed "in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will
provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection." Cascade Auto
11
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Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753 (2005) ...The

burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its
coverage." Arreguin, 145 Idaho at 461, 180 P.3d at 500.
Although no Idaho appellate court has yet undertaken to interpret the Prior Publication
exclusion found in the Truck policy, the identical exclusion has been held by other courts to be
clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, 555 F.3d 772,
777 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Plainly reading the first publication exclusion and the relevant advertising
injury definition together indicates that the parties intended to exclude from coverage any
copyright infringement injury that arose from an oral or written publication of material first
published before the policy became effective."); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Out.fillers, Inc., 806
F.3d 761, 767-68 (3d Cir. 2015); Capitol lndem. Corp. v. Elston SelfServ. Wholesale Groceries,
Inc., 559 F.3d 616,620 (7th Cir. 2009). 8

The exclusion was recently analyzed by the Ninth Circuit in the case of Street Surfing.
LLC v. Great Am. E & S Ins. Co .. 776 F.3d 603,610 (9th Cir. 2014)(applying California law).

Initially, the court noted that the "straightforward purpose of this exclusion is to 'bar coverage'
when the 'wrongful behavior ... beg[a]n prior to the effective date of the insurance policy."',
quoting Taco Bell Corp. v. Cont'/ Cas. Co., 388 F.3d I 069, I 072 (7th Cir.2004) and citing Kim
Seng Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 179 Cal.App.4th 1030 (2009)("The purpose of the prior

publication exclusion is to preclude coverage for risks that have already materialized .... "). The
court further explained:
In the context of advertising injury coverage, an allegedly wrongful advertisement
published before the coverage period triggers application of the prior publication
exclusion. If this threshold showing is made, the exclusion bars coverage of
injuries arising out of republication of that advertisement, or any substantially
similar advertisement, during the policy period 1 because such later publications
are part of a single, continuing wrong that began before the insurance policy went
into effect
Id, cites omitted.

Truck points out that OBC's claims against Scout arise directly from Scout's
unauthorized use of the mark "ROUGE" in the operation of its restaurant and bar- a use which
11

See also, Scottsdale ln.s. Co. v. Sullfrun Properties, Inc., 2006 WL 505170, at

•s (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2006)(finding

the exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for Defendants' prior infringing use of the "Kapalua" name.)
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was alleged to have begun prior to the effective date of the policy. According to Truck, these
allegations place the claims squarely within the exclusion. Scout argues that the tenn
"publication of material" in th<: Prior Publication exclusion refers only to an actionable
publication of injurious material. 9 It argues that since the October Post only infringed on OBC's
··Restaurant, pub and catering services" trademark, and Gone Rogue Pub was not even operating
at the time of the post, the post could not have been injurious to OBC. On this point, Scout relies
on the Seventh Circuit case of Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Elston SelfSen•ice Wholesale

Groceries. Inc., which stated:
We understand the tenn "material" in the exclusion to refer to "injurious"
material. By its terms, the prior publication exclusion abrogates the insurer's duty
to defend only where it can prove that the insured's prior publication of the same
actionable, injurious material alleged in the underlying complaint occurred prior
to the beginning of its policy. This interpretation is logical because the exclusion
exists to prevent an insured from purchasing an insurance policy to cover liability
for illegal acts which it had undertaken prior to purchasing the policy. Put another
way, the purpose of the exclusion is to prevent an individual who has caused an
injury from buying insurance so that he can continue his injurious behavior.
We do not see any ambiguity in the meaning of the exclusion; it seems clear that
the exclusion only abrogates the duty to defend where the insured's first
publication of actionable material occurred prior to the beginning of its policy.
559 F.3d 616,620 (7th Cir.2009).

Initially, Scout's argument relies on evidence outside the allegations of the OBC
Complaint, which is irrelevant in considering whether an insurer has a duty to defend. Rather, as
discussed, the duty to defend is framed solely by the allegations of the underlying complaint.
Here, the OBC Complaint alleges that Scout's use of the "ROGUE" mark was unauthorized, the
use commenced in October of 2012, and the use caused OBC harm. Thus, the OBC Complaint
asserts a continuing course of infringing and injurious conduct since prior to the effective period
of the policy. Whether or not Scout's October Post was actually injurious because Gone Rogue
Pub was not yet open for business is not germane to the inquiry since injury beginning in
October of 2012 was clearly alleged in the OBC Complaint.

9

Alternatively, Scout argues that the exclusion is ambiguous because it does not expressly indicate whether the first
publication of the material be injurious or actionable.
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Further, even if facts extrinsic to the OBC Complaint were considered, i.e., that Gone
Rogue Pub was not yet operation in October of 2012, the exclusion would still apply. To this
end, the Court does not agree with Capito/ Indemnity's interpretation of the exclusion. Unless
ambiguous, this Court must apply lh~ policy according to its plain language and not add words to
either create or avoid liability. Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 69-70, 205 P.3d at 1205-06. The
exclusion applies where the advertising injury "aris[ cs] out of... written publication of material
whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period." "Arise" is
commonly defined as "to come into being, action or notice; originate; appear; spring up." 10
Courts have broadly interpreted the phrase "arising out of' as used in insurance policies. In Fed.
Jns. Co. v. Tri-State lns. Co., the Tenth Circuit Court examined the phrase "arising out of' as it is

used in insurance policies in depth. 157 F.3d 800, 804 ( I0th Cir. 1998). It held that " ... the
general consensus [is] that the phrase "arising out of' should be given a broad reading such as
"originating from" or "growing out of' or "flowing from" or "done in coMection with"- that is,
it requires some causal connection to the injuries suffered, but docs not require proximate cause
in the legal sense." Id. The Court's holding was based upon its analysis of case law throughout
the country, as well as several treatises on insurance law. Id. The Court also held that the broad
reading of the phrase "arising out of' is applicable to both inclusionary and exclusionary causes.
Fed. Ins. Co., 157 F.3d at 804-805. 11

Applying this broad definition of"arising out of' to the exclusion, it is evident that the
first publication of material need not be independently "actionable" or "injurious" for the
exclusion to apply. Rather, it need only be causally connected to the advertising injuries alleged.
Stated another way, the advertising injuries alleged must flow from the first publication, but the
first publication need not be the proximate cause of the injuries. To construe the provision as
requiring that the first publication be independently injurious or actionable would not only ignore

11

See also Jlugenherg v. West Am. Im. Co./Ohio Cas. Group, 249 S.W.3d 174, 186 87 (Ky. Ct App. 2006)
("arising out of' means "originating from, or having its origin in, grounding out of or flowing from"); Taurus
Holdings. Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 539-40 (Fla. 2005) ("arising out of' as Ul!Cd in a
CGL policy exclusion unambiguous and broader in meaning than the tcnn "caused by'' and means "originating
from," "having il'I origin in," "growing out of,'' "flowing from," "incident to'' or "having a coMection with");
Meadowbrook, In,·. , .. Tower Ins. Co.. Inc., SS9 N. W.2d 411, 419- 20 (Minn. 1997) ("arising out of' in a CGL
insurance policy exclusion means "causally coMccted with" and not "proximately caUl!Cd by"): accord Records,,.

Aetna Life & Cas. Ins., 683 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. 1996), American Motori.~ts Ins. Co.,,. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d
1007 (N.J. 1998).
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the common definition of "arising out of' but would also insert words where they do not appear,
which is contrary to Idaho's rules of contract interpretation. For this reason, the Court does not
find Scout's interpretation reasonable and, therefore, does not find the exclusion ambiguous for
the reason cited by Scout.
Case law supports this Court's conclusion in this regard. In Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v.
Travelers Lloyds ins. Co., the court concluded that the application of an identical exclusion does

not hinge on whether the first publication was actionable, but rather on when the material giving
rise to an actionable claim was first published. 203 F. Supp. 2d 704, 718 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
Similar to Scout's argument, the insureds in Matagorda argued that the Prior Publication
exclusion did not preclude coverage since some of the copyrights allegedly infringed upon were
not registered when the prior publications took place and, therefore, the prior publications were
not infringing. Id. at 717-18. The court found that argument unpersuasive, noting that "[t]he
relevant question for the exclusion, however, is not when the claim first became actionable, but
when the material giving rise to the claim was first published. The copyright infringement claim
arose from "material whose first publication took place before the begiMing of the policy
period." Id. Likewise, in Kim Seng Co. v. Great American bis. Co. ofNew York, the insured
argued that the Court should consider whether its pre-policy-issuance publication gave rise to the
..likelihood of confusion" and constituted infringement when it was made. 179 Cal.App.4th
1030, 1043 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 537,547 (2009), as modified on denial ofreh'g (Dec. 7, 2009). The
Court declined, stating, "[w]e do not deal with whether there was an infringement, but rather
whether there is coverage." Id.
To the extent Capitol Indemnity holds that first publication of a mark be independently
injurious or actionable, the holding is confined to the unique facts of that case and cannot be
interpreted as requiring an insurer to evaluate whether the first alleged publication of a mark is
independently actionable in determining its duty to defend. Capitol Indemnity involved a suit for
trademark infringement based on the defendant's sale of counterfeit cigarettes displaying the
Newport trademark. 559 F.3d at 619-20. Prior to the effective date of the policy, the defendant
sold genuine Newport cigarettes with packaging and wrapping displaying the Newport marks.
After the policy went into effect, however, the defendant began selling counterfeit cigarettes in
the same packaging. id. The insurer argued that the Prior Publication exclusion barred

coverage-and, therefore, abrogated its duty to defend- because the cigarette packaging and
15
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wrapping containing the Newport mar_ks was first ''published" before the policy began. Id. at
620. The court disagreed because the pre-policy publication was not actionable-the defendant
was actually selling genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. The infringement alleged in the underlying
complaint was the defendant's sale of counterfeit cigarettes with Nt:wport packaging, not the sale
of genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. at 619. By contrast, OBC alleged that Scout's pre-policy
publication of the Gone Rogue Pub logo in October of 2012 marked the origination date of
Scout's acts that result in the infringement. Thus, Capitol Indemnity is not factually or legally
applicable.
b.

The publications occurring during the coverage period were not fresh
wrongs.

Even if pre-coverage infringing advertisement triggers the applica~ion of the Prior
Publication exclusion, some courts find that the exclusion will not apply to post-coverage
advertisements which are sufficiently distinct from the pre-coverage advertisements. As
explained by the Ninth Circuit, "[i]f a later advertisement is not substantially similar to the precoverage advertisement, [... ), it constitutes a distinct, or 'fresh,' wrong that does not fall within
the prior publication exclusion's scope." Street Su,fing, 776 F.3d at 610. A post-coverage
publication is 'substantially similar' to a pre-coverage publication if both publications carry out
the same alleged wrong." Id. at 613. Additionally, where the underlying complaint charges the
infringing publications as separate torts, the torts that occurred during the policy period are
covered because they are substantially different from the torts that occurred prior to the policy
period: Id.
Scout contends that, even if its October Post triggered the application of the exclusion, its
later publications of the mark, occurring after coverage took effect were ..fresh wrongs" as
described in Street Surfing because they violated OBC's other trademarks: "Beer and Ale";
"Beverage glassware"; "Beer"; and "Clothing." According to Scout, for Truck to be relieved of
its duty to defend, it must establish that Scout's October Post violated all five trademarks and
constituted a violation of each tort set forth in the OBC Complaint.
Street Surfing lends no favor to Scout's position. There, the infringer initially sold

skateboards affixed with a particular Street Surfing logo. Id. at 606. After obtaining insurance,
Street Surfing expanded its product line to skateboard accessories, also affixed with the Street
Surfing logo. Ultimately Street Surfing was sued by the owner of the mark and Street Surfing's
16
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insurer refused to defend pursuant to the Prior Publication exclusion. Id. Street Surfing sued its
insu~er, arguing inter alia, that its pre-policy publications of the logo were no~ substantially
similar to the post-coverage advertisements because they were affixed to different products. Id.
at 612-13. The court disagreed for two r~a.sons. First, the underlying complaint did not charge the
misappropriations as separate torts depending on the specific advertisements. Rather, it generally
alleged that Street Surfing infringed on the mark by using the name and logo on its products,
without making any distinction between the types of products. Id. at 614. Second, although the
advertisements featured di tTerent products, the court found it was not ·a "material distinction

ti,

because the advertising idea being used was the same regardless of the product: the products all
used the allegedly infringing identification "Street Surfing." Id. 11
In so holding, the court contrasted the facts of the case from those presented in Taco Bell
Corp.. where the Seventh Circuit found the "fresh wrong" argument applicable. 388 F.3d at

1073-74. In Taco Bell, the underlying complaint arose from Taco Bell's advertising campaign
using the general theme of a "Chihuahua obsessed with the thought of Taco Bell food to the
exclusion of anything else." Id. at I072. The plaintiff in that suit alleged that Taco Bell had
misappropriated a marketing gimmick he had created featuring a "psycho Chihuahua. Id.
ti

Because a portion of Taco Bell's ad campaign began before its insurance policy took effect, its
insurer contended that the policy's Prior Publication exclusion eliminated its duty to defend.
However, the court ruled that even though Taco Bell had used the same basic crazy Chihuahua
theme in different ways before and after the inception of the insurance policy, the Prior
Publication exclusion did not apply because the underlying lawsuit charged Taco Bell with
misappropriation of distinct advertising ideas as separate torts, some of which occurred during
the policy period. Id. 1J
The facts of this case are far more closely aligned with Street Surfi11g than Taco Bell. As
in Street Surfing, the claims asserted in the OBC Complaint are grounded in Scout's continuing
12

Sec also, Hunovl!r Ins. Co.,.. Urban Ouifitters, Inc:.. 806 F.3d 761, 768 (3d Ci.r. 201S) (rejecting argument that
Urban Outfitters pre-coverage Ul!C of the mark "Navajo" in advertising a bracelet on its website wa.,i substantially
different from its post-coverage use of the mark in later product lines, which included clothing, shoes, flasks, etc.
because they all carried a consistent theme and common objective).
1
-' For e:itample. later Taco Bell commercials appropriated not only the underlying psycho Chihuahua theme, but also
subordinate ideas such a.'I the Chihuahua's poking its head through a hole at the end of the commercial. 388 F.3d at

1073.

-
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unauthorized use of the mark ..ROGUE" in advertising. Unlike in Taco Bell, OBC did not charge
separate torts based on uses prior to versus during Truck's coverage period. Further, there is no
thematic difference between the alleged publications as there was in Taco Bell. Rather, as in

Street Surfing, Scours publications all arise from same single, continuing use the word
.. ROGUE" in advertising Gone Rogue Pub, which is an appropriation of OBC's advertising idea.
Therefore, Scout's post-effective date uses of the mark are not "fresh wrongs" which would
avoid the application of the Prior Publication exclusion.
In sum, Truck has established that the Prior Publication clearly and unambiguously
excludes coverage for the claims asserted against Scout in the OBC Complaint. Consequently,
this Court concludes as a matter of law that Truck did not have a duty to defend against the
claims and summary judgment in Truck's favor is warranted on Scout's breach of contract claim.
Further, where there is no coverage under an insurance policy, there can be no breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing. nor can there be liability for bad faith. Rizzo v. State Farm Ins.
Co .. 155 Idaho 75, 84,305 P.3d 519,528 (2013). Therefore, summary judgment in Truck's favor

is also warranted on Scout's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
insurance bad faith claims.

V.

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Scout's motion for summary judgment

and GRANTS Truck's motion for summary judgment. A final judgment shall be issued
contemporaneously with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated this

/ J rY_
clay of July, 2017

18
APPENDIXC

000612
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